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The Value of Investment Research: How Do company visits affect the Performance of 
Professional Investors? 
Mariane Keushgerian 
We test a sample of 205 Canadian and 938 US equity funds during the period 2008 
through 2011. Specifically, we look at whether manager characteristics and actions have any 
bearing on the performance, management fees and systematic risk of the funds with a special 
focus on the impact of company visits. We find that company visits consistently positively 
and significantly affect performance, portfolio turnover and fees leading us to conclude that 
in the case of the US sample, company visits have a value added effect while we are 
inconclusive on its effects on the Canadian sample. Other findings using the three stage least 
square methodology show that for the Canadian sample, investment experience and 
employee equity ownership positively affect the fund‘s beta and team size has a positive 
impact on fees while company visits have a positive impact only in the system with the 
Sharpe ratio as the performance measure. The US results show that investment experience 
has a positive and significant impact on the fund‘s beta while a negative impact on both 
portfolio turnover and fees. Finally, employee equity ownership also has a positive impact on 
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The Investment Company Institute Factbook (ICI, 2011), shows that US Investment 
management firms had US $13.1 trillion in total net assets under management at the end of 
2010, an increase of US $943 billion and US $2.8 trillion compared to  2009 and 2008 
respectively, demonstrating the sheer size of the industry as a whole. AS per the ICI, 74% of 
these assets are managed by fund management companies making them the key players in the 
financial markets. The ICI report shows that over the years 2008 through 2010 there has been 
a 5% decrease in the number of investment firms. This consolidation is partly attributed to 
the turbulent macroeconomic environment. On the other hand, the Investment Funds Institute 
of Canada (IFIC, 2011) report
1
 shows that the fund management industry in Canada had a 
total of CAD $636 billion in assets under management as at the end of 2010, an increase of 
CAD $41 billion and CAD $129 billion over 2009 and 2008 respectively. The report further 
shows that similar to the US, between 2008 through 2010; there was a 6% decrease in the 
number of Canadian management firms. The growth of the Canadian fund industry was 
highlighted by Klapper et al (2005) who document in their study of the worldwide growth of 
Mutual funds in the 90‘s, the average annual growth rate of Canadian funds was 26.2% from 
1992 to 1998 and that equity funds represented 48% of the mutual fund industry in Canada 
during that period.  The driving force behind this multi-trillion dollar industry are 1) the 
people investing their moneys into investment funds, the individual or institutional investors 
and 2) as described by Barker (1998), the people who ―are responsible for buying, holding 
and selling shares, and thereby determining share prices‖, the fund managers. The focus of 
this paper is on the latter since fund managers hold considerable influence over share prices; 





this makes them an interesting subject to study. The primary services offered by fund 
managers, as articulated by Gurley and Shaw (1960), are ―professionally managed, 
diversified portfolios, […] technical expertise involved in the portfolio‘s selection, […] and 
continuous supervision of the portfolio.‖ With such attributes as management style, timing, 
stock picking ability, amongst other qualities, they are the ones holding considerable 
influence in this thriving industry. Investment managers make use of a variety of information 
in security selection for their portfolios. As identified by Lee and Tweedie (1981), Moizer 
and Arnold (1984), Barker (1998), their wealth of information emanate from formal 
meetings, annual reports, sell side and buy side analysts, results announcements, other direct 
contact with the companies, market news, investors‘ meetings, newspapers, industry 
contacts, and industry information services. Of particular interest is the personal contact such 
as formal meetings and direct contact that fund managers have with company executives. 
Such contacts and meetings allow fund managers access to certain strategic or tactical 
information that is not found in financial statements which gives them clues as to the future 
of the company. Hence, this research aims to test empirically whether the frequency of 
company visits is a contributing factor in fund performance and if so, does it have a positive 
effect on performance?  
We examine a sample of 205 Canadian and 938 US equity funds during the period 
2008 through 2011. We find that company visits consistently positively and significantly 
affect performance, portfolio turnover and fees leading us to conclude that in the case of the 
US sample, company visits have a value added effect while we are inconclusive on its effects 
on the Canadian sample. Among some of the human capital characteristics, the three stage 
least square methodology results for the Canadian sample shows that investment experience 
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and employee equity ownership positively affect the fund‘s beta while team size has a 
positive impact on fees. We further find that frequency of company visits have a positive 
impact on trading activity only in the system with the Sharpe ratio as the performance 
measure. The US results show that investment experience has a positive and significant 
impact on the fund‘s beta while a negative impact on both portfolio turnover and fees. 
Finally, employee equity ownership also has a positive impact on systematic risk while team 
size has a positive impact on fees.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it is the first study we know of that looks 
specifically at company visits and shows the differing behaviors of Canadian and US fund 
managers. Second, it highlights and reinforces to professional investors that although 
company visits is a sacrifice in terms of their time and the additional costs however, we show 
that these visits are of added value permitting them to make better company valuation, thus 
being more selective in the stocks they choose and garnering better performance. Third, it 
serves as a view of market efficiency since as Barker (1998) describes it ―analysts regard 
company contact as an opportunity to introduce value-relevant news to the market and that 
they ‗sell‘ as quickly and as widely as possible their interpretation of news‖. 
This paper will be divided in the following sequence; first, we will be discussing the 
rationale for using company visits as the focus of our study. Next, we will be reviewing 
related literature on performance. Section 4 will be stating the hypothesis for our research, 
then the data and methodology will be explained in section 5, followed by the results of the 
Canadian sample and the US sample in sections 6 and 7 respectively, and finally the last 
section will conclude the study. 
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2. Literature On Company visits 
Company visits is one of many methods employed by fund managers in assessing the 
companies comprising their funds. As defined by Lee and Tweedie (1981) ―it is the receipt of 
information obtained from visits to companies‖ and further elaborated by Glaum and 
Friedrich (2006), it involves personal contact and face-to-face interactions with company 
personnel. Through Arnold and Moizer (1984) detailed survey, we find that these meetings 
give fund managers the opportunity to discuss such information as the ―company‘s past 
trading performance, details of management long term objectives and plans and the reasons 
for changes in the balance sheet, data on costs and margins, the outlook of demand for the 
company‘s products, the current labor situation, plans for future capital investment, and 
information on competitors‖. While company visits offer fund managers crucial qualitative 
information on the values, culture and work ethic of the company, it also gives them access 
to quantitative information as it gives them a chance to discuss the figures found in the 
financial statements. Many fund managers are in disagreement on its benefits, as one 
portfolio manager put it ―it is a function of what is necessary and what is relevant. What does 
it require in order for us to have the confidence that we are making good decisions. The 
interesting exercise in our industry is to profess the number of company visits or the number 
of analysts. We have yet to find a direct correlation between those metrics and the ability to 
outperform over time.‖2 It is precisely this, the aim of our study, to show that there is a direct 
a correlation between visits and performance and that it indirectly affects turnover and fees 
since they are all interrelated. 





Although there is a vast literature on funds and fund management which will be discussed 
shortly, especially in examining fund manager behavior and the effect it has on performance, 
one aspect that has not received a great deal of attention is the frequency of company visits, 
fund managers undertake to ensure that their information, research and analyses of the 
securities comprising the fund(s) under their management is in line with their firsthand 
account of the company. It is essentially a way for the fund manager to verify the quality of 
information found in financial statements, that the company is in good standing, and to 
ensure themselves of their choices in building portfolio.  
Lee and Tweedie (1981) were one of the earliest to publish a comprehensive research 
on fund managers (Insurance companies, pension funds, investment and unit trusts, merchant 
banks and stockbroking firms) and their ―use of financial information‖. Using a sample of 
231 interviews, they look individually at such factors as fund managers‘ level of 
understanding of financial information, of their use of such information, and of their use of 
annual reports. Furthermore they investigate additional sources of information which 
consider the importance of company visits and the value of the information that can be 
extracted from it.  Amongst their results, Lee and Tweedie (1981) find that ―44% of those 
employed by stock broking firms declare that their firms visited all companies frequently‖. 
They further find that ―46% of stock broking firms declared that their organization visited on 
a frequent basis, all companies in which it was interested‖. Moreover, when they question the 
purpose of these visits and what the fund managers anticipate to learn from them, they find 
that fund managers were interested in getting hold of a direct sense of the management of the 
investee company. Specifically, they document that 56% of those surveyed show a need for 
crucial information regarding the company‘s growth, managements‘ capabilities, upcoming 
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projects, whether they have achieved what they set out to do, in addition to financial reports 
to evaluate likelihood of future success. Although the financial managers being surveyed rate 
company visits least important when compared with two other sources of information, 
nevertheless 38% of them still regard company visits as paramount, and finally they find that 
62% of fund managers working in stock broking firms rated company visits as holding 
material weight in portfolio decision making in contrast to their counterparts in financial 
institutions. Chugh and Meador (1984) highlight the importance company visits bear on the 
valuation process of analysts since through such visits; they are able to ascertain the 
attributes of management, which represent a core element of the company value. They show 
that analysts place great value on human capital attributes to make sense out of the 
quantitative data at their disposal. For instance, they find that ―when determining stock value 
analysts appear to look most closely at long term predictors of qualitative growth earnings, 
particularly to the quality and depth of management‖ among other factors. 
Through interviews with 27 UK financial institutions, Holland and Doran (1998) 
draw conclusions on the role of company visits and its implications in the valuation process. 
They show that through repeated company visits fund managers are able to cultivate good 
relations with investee companies and through these relationships, they develop a 
‗relationship information collection‘ process which enhance the funds they manage thereby 
aiding them in ‗stock selection and asset allocation‘. The fund managers interviewed hold 
that it is through the development and maintenance of these relationships that they secure a 
better understanding of the investee company, its current situation, its goals, and long term 
strategy. They explain that through these visits, they learn such beneficial information as the 
―quality and personality of management‖ and this instills a ―trust and confidence‖ in them. 
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They have the chance to evaluate management by keeping a close eye on their mode of 
interaction with one another, their oral exchanges, whether they are in agreement with one 
another and inferring their personalities. Indeed, one fund manager says that ―these 
impressions are as important to us as a slide full of financial figures‖ (Holland & Doran, 
1998).   This in turn, enriches them with a ―reservoir of knowledge‖ regarding the investee 
company.  Moreover, this accumulation of company specific information is particularly 
advantageous as it helps them in making better trading decisions. All of these along with a 
discussion of the financial reports help fund managers in interweaving valuable information 
to create a ―knowledge advantage‖ and provides new ground on how to make better sense of 
arising information and how it affects the value of the company.  Along the same line of 
examination, Holland (1998) explores company visits in light of ―private meetings‖ as a 
means to gain insight on the top management of the company invested in. Amongst some of 
the highlights of the study, he concludes that the favorable properties of management are 
major contributors to the financial well-being of the company and that this can only be 
discerned by recurring visits. 
Roberts et al (2006) study in detail how company visits function as a source of 
governance process between managers and shareholders. Thus, in bringing together fund 
managers and the companies they have invested in, the company takes a good look at itself 
and the message it is trying to convey about its strategy, performance and goals and 
―reminds‖ them that they are being watched; while the fund manager pays close attention to 
the work ethics and demeanor of the management team. They explain that the setting of the 
meeting whereby, management presents itself to fund managers offers them the opportunity 
to inquire about figures found in the financial reports and a clarification of any ambiguity on 
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the fund manager‘s part. On the other hand, besides gaining a clarity and better 
comprehension of the company‘s position, fund managers focus on the general ambiance of 
the meeting such as the ―tone, mood, gesture and interaction‖ of the investee company‘s 
management.  
In his in-depth examination of the governance role of fund managers in their investee 
companies and consequently his proposition of a five-stage dynamic model of fund manager 
corporate governance influence, Holland (2002) explains that the composition of current 
financial reports have become characterized as ―too complex, too large and too cumbersome‖ 
for both professional money managers and individual investors. He holds that the lack of 
information at fund managers‘ disposal used in valuating companies is due to the 
unavailability of crucial qualitative information such as intellectual capital (quality of 
management, coherence and credibility, strategy…) and intangible factors which he explains 
are built in the share price.  Accordingly, he shows that the fund managers in his case study 
use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data in the valuation process.  They reveal 
that the prevalence of financial data and variables in the financial report only gave them 
access to quantitative knowledge but did not give fund managers the opportunity to examine 
the qualitative aspects which they find is an integral part of a company as a determinant 
factor of its long-term success. Furthermore, since financial reports are available to the 
public, it neither gave them a knowledge advantage over their competitors in stock-picking in 
order to enhance their performance, nor did it provide them with information concerning 
management and personnel. Therefore, Holland (2002) concludes that financial reports are 
not ―an effective mechanism for disclosing information on intangibles such as corporate 
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knowledge assets and innovatory skills‖ and that ―sole reliance on public sources of 
information limited fund manager‘s understanding of portfolio companies‖. 
Continuing with his inquiry into fund manager‘s corporate governance process, 
Holland (2002) explains that the difficulty faced by fund managers due to their dependence 
only on financial reports for sources of information motivated them to request more meetings 
and face-to-face contact with senior management teams in order to give them the opportunity 
to ask critical questions concerning both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the company, 
which would give them the relevant information to gauge the company value and tie it to its 
performance. Specifically, he elaborates that ―the fund managers used the private meetings to 
identify the major qualitative factors affecting value creation and corporate valuation. These 
provided the conceptual base to explore how these factors interacted with each other over 
time and hence how the value-creation process functioned in investee companies‖ (Holland, 
2002). And it is presumed that precisely the combination of the qualitative information 
extracted from these meetings along with the information present in the financial reports that 
the portfolio manager has an enhanced understanding of the portfolios he is managing and is 
better equipped in decision making concerning asset allocation and stock picking. This 
endeavor on the fund manager‘s part leads him to re-examine company valuations using the 
new qualitative information and its implications on performance. 
 Although Holland‘s extensive study of the methods employed by fund managers in 
their decision making process, was studied in light of corporate governance mechanism, it 
has major implications on the paper at hand because the very fact that it emphasizes private 
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meetings and direct contact with investee companies causing them to review the valuation of 
the company illustrates how instrumental company visits are in the management of funds. 
  
Company visits are vital as Wright (2007) probes practitioners in the industry, one 
energy equity analyst says, it allowed him to ―gain a better feel for how the industry worked 
and how all the assets fit together‖.  Some of the key highlights of company visits include an 
assessment of the quality of management, and its strategies in pursuit of its long term goals. 
Moreover, he notes that with enough visits to a company, one can notice flaws in the 
management or recognize some of their strong qualities which would be instrumental in 
achieving future company goals. Another small cap value mutual fund manager says that 
company visits instills a sense of assurance when investing in companies. Furthermore, 
company visits allow analysts ―to test the credibility of the company‘s assertions about 
itself‖. Therefore, although company visits are not guarantees that the company you are 
investing in will show favorable performance in the future but it will at least give you a better 
understanding of the company, its culture, and its vision. Similarly, Opiela (2004) looks into 
selection decisions of some mutual fund managers and finds that in addition to the research 
on fund rating, analysis of performance, and strategies they use in completing their tasks, one 
fund manager stresses the importance of company visits. He says that those visits provide 
him with a ―real sense of the corporate culture‖, the work ethic and environment and an 
indication of where the company is heading.  
Through a series of questions asked of fund managers to rate, Barker (1998) finds that 
the most important source of information for fund managers are obtained through ‗formal 
meetings with senior company management‘ with annual reports being second most 
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important. They explain that through meetings with senior management, they have the 
opportunity to get a well rounded view of the company, its management and its strategy and 
how they implement it. This accumulation of knowledge about the company helps them to 
better identify what factors affect share price. Contrary to the above, Barker finds that some 
fund managers consider site visits, of minimal importance stating that they were a drain to 
their time and offered a myopic view of the company. However, he does find in the same 
study that fund managers place high value on ‗personal contact‘. Glaum and Friedrich (2006) 
find that in the telecommunications industry, analysts rate contact with company 
representatives, financial statements, analysts conferences, and company visits in this order 
as the most helpful sources of information to valuate companies. Pike et al (1993) find that 
the most pertinent sources of information for British investment analysts are; discussions 
with company personnel and analysts‘ meetings in-company, with annual reports as the 3rd 
most important source of information. The reason that investment analysts value individual 
contact more than financial reports is because it allows for them to discuss results of the 
financial reports. In exploring the methods used by UK investment analysts in their choice of 
buying and selling shares, Moizer and Arnold (1984) find that along with annual report items 
such as the income statement, balance sheet, the other major source of information they most 
rely on are contact with the investee company‘s personnel. Similarly, Day (1986) explores 
how meaningful UK investment analysts find certain items in the financial statements and 
how frequently they make use of them in their analysis of a company. The results show that 
the main items investment analysts look at first glance were Long term debt/loans/ 
borrowing, Balance sheet, and profits, however, they explain that the financial report is 
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considered a ‗point of reference‘ and that contact with the company‘s management is 
regarded as crucial in their analysis process. 
 
Holland (2006), in his survey of fund managers, finds that fund managers are critical 
of financial reports for a number of reasons, three of which are 1) that the information 
supplied by the interim reports is not valuable since they are already aware of the information 
it contains and therefore the information is already built in the share price and 2) that the 
financial report is ―too complex, too large and too cumbersome‖ and 3)  that there is a 
prevalence of financial performance indicators and drawbacks in qualitative measures such 
as ‗quality of management‘. After naming a number of other limitations, Holland explains 
that public knowledge along with private knowledge derived from meetings with 
management of investee companies are essential for fund management performance.  
In the same line of thought, Lev and Zarowin (1999) find that the value of financial 
report information has shown a decline in the past 20 years and that this coincides with 
change in the US business enterprise mainly driven by ‗innovative activities‘. They hold that 
it is due to the deficiency in reporting for intangibles that the accounting methods fall short in 
displaying ‗performance and enterprise value‘.  
Thus far, most studies covering the importance of company visits have used interview 
based studies in order to demonstrate the crucial role it plays in fund managers‘ decision 
making process. Whereas interview based studies reveal fund manager‘s views and outlook, 
the present study attempts to use statistical tests to show fund manager‘s actions. To the best 
of our knowledge, there have not been empirical studies in highlighting the importance of 
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company visits to fund managers in their decision making process and thereby its effect on 
performance.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
There has been a vast literature covering various aspects of fund performance in the 
US. Since the work of Jensen (1968), funds have been analyzed in terms of management 
style (passive versus active management), management incentive (employment risk versus 
compensation risk), stock selection ability, it is also been studied in terms of governance 
structure. A more recent approach in studying the determining factors in fund performance 
has been in light of intellectual capital, that is, how fund manager specific characteristics play 
a role in influencing their performance. The following sections highlight some important 
studies in the different categories of fund performance research.  
 
3.1 Performance and human capital 
 
According to human capital theory, individual characteristics such as education and 
experience function together in creating output, and in turn determine the compensation of 
workers.  It follows that their individual experience, their education, their age even their 
gender are factors that affect their decision making, risk-taking behavior, and their overall 
performance. For instance, level of experience would most likely affect their know-how, 
educational background would affect their analytical skills, some studies have even found 
that gender affects amount of risk taken. For instance, Golec (1996) examines such 
characteristics as manager age, tenure, education, and whether or not he/she had an MBA to 
14 
 
see whether they have any bearing on key functions of a fund, that is, expenses charged, the 
risk, and performance. Amongst his findings, the manager‘s tenure, the MBA variable as 
well as fees have a positive and significant impact on the fund‘s performance while age and 
other expenses have a negative impact on the performance of the fund. Adding on to Golec 
(1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) perform a similar study with the addition of a ‗college 
quality‘ variable as well as other tests controlling for survivorship bias and investment style. 
Their most consistent finding is that those managers who attended higher quality colleges 
display better performance than their counterparts. Similarly, Gottesman and Morey (2006) 
look at the difference in performance of managers holding an MBA, distinguishing them 
according to the MBA quality and find that indeed, higher quality MBAs are conducive to 
better performance. They also look at whether other educational accomplishments such as 
CFA among other variables affect mutual fund performance. They find that managers with 
other qualifications do not significantly impact fund performance. Along with education 
variables, Switzer and Huang (2007) explore how gender
3
, tenure, and experience affect 
small and midcap equity fund performance. Through their simultaneous equation 
methodology they find that the education variable MBA is negatively related to measures of 
performance while neither tenure and experience nor gender show a significant relation to the 
performance of small and midcap funds. Costa et al (2006) investigate the effects of manager 
experience by studying their performance during different business cycles. They conclude 
that it is mainly due to prolonged upward (downward) movements in the market that fund 
managers show negative (positive) performance and that it is not attributed to their 
experience.  
                                                          
3
 Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003), Estes and Hosseini (1988), Barber and Odeon (2001), Powell and Ansic 
(1997) among others explore the role of gender and performance. 
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As human capital gains more attention, it is evident that quantitative as well as non-
quantitative factors play a determining role in fund management decisions thus performance. 
Holland (2003) states that, money managers during the 1990s and later, started focusing on 
the managerial attributes of target investees, having discovered how these qualities and 
changes thereof affect the stock price of a specific company. 
 
3.2 Performance and management style 
 
As stated by Holland (2010) ―active fund managers share fundamental beliefs about 
imperfections in the market and believed that their superior skills were the means to succeed 
in investment decisions.‖ Gruber (1996) probes into the question as to why actively managed 
funds are so appealing. He conducts a comprehensive study, testing mutual funds by type and 
then in terms of persistence, expenses, cash flows and ROI and he concludes that funds that 
are actively managed are indeed beneficial but that they display negative performance due to 
high fees. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) come up with a new variable to calculate degree of 
active management called Active share and they document that active management of 
portfolios presents an advantage to investors since they exhibit outperformance relative to 
their benchmarks.  Related to style is the issue of persistence of fund performance, that is, the 
likelihood of funds which displayed positive performance in the past year to continue doing 
so in the following years; and not management ability that is responsible for positive risk-
adjusted performance. For instance, Elton et al (1996) and Gruber (1996) show results 
similar to Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) while accounting for survivorship bias, 
namely, funds that perform well in the previous year will continue doing so the following 
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year, additionally they find that these results persist when using a three year horizon. 
Similarly, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), report persistence of funds over a long period of 
time. Carhart (1997), also finds in a sample of 1,892 diversified equity funds from 1962 to 
1993, that funds displaying positive performance in one year will continue doing so the 
following year but not afterward, while funds displaying negative performance in one year 




3.3 Performance and stock selection ability 
Among the managerial abilities that have been studied in portfolio management is stock 
picking ability, as many investors believe that it is in a manager‘s ability to choose stocks 
according to the their valuation and research that certain funds outperform their benchmarks. 
Wermers (2000) delves deeply into this outlook by dissecting performance of actively 
managed funds into several parts, that is, stock selection ability, timing ability, and style 
objective of the fund as well as trade costs, expenses, and benchmark adjusted excess returns. 
Some of his findings over the period 1975 to 1994 include, high turnover funds perform 
better than low turnover funds; moreover he finds small capitalization funds perform better 
than their large capitalization counterparts, he attributes these results to managerial talent.  
Daniel et al (1997) begin their inquiry into the performance of mutual funds by stating that 
―half of the expenses of mutual funds arise because of their stock selection efforts‖. They 
conduct their study by first building benchmarks comparable in terms of size, book to market 
ratio, and prior year returns. Evaluating the fund manager‘s stock picking and timing ability, 
along with the style objective, they conclude that fund managers do have superior skill in 
                                                          
4
 read also Brown, S. J. & Goetzmann, W. N. (1995). 
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terms of picking ability but that it is not strong enough to achieve returns surpassing its 
benchmark after expenses are deducted. Kosowski et al (2006) document that fund managers 
have superior skills. They analyze fund performance over a 27 year period using the 
bootstrap method, and they find that those funds whose performance they ascribe to 
managerial skill show superior performance pre and post deducted expenses.  
 
3.4 Performance and incentives 
Another strand of the performance literature is devoted to explaining that incentives are 
the driving force behind fund manager‘s performance. Fund managers are principally 
motivated by 2 things, job security and compensation. Brown et al (1996), test a group of 334 
funds and find evidence that fund managers who are lagging behind midyear in contrast to 
other fund managers, engage in more risk taking behavior than their counterparts in order to 
improve their fund's performance till year end. Similarly, Kemph, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) 
use upward and downward trends in the market to determine which incentive prevails in the 
different states and determine that employment (compensation) incentives are one of key 
drivers of change in risk-taking in fund manager‘s behavior during downward (upward) shifts 
in the market.  In exploring job security matters of fund managers, Chevalier and Ellison‘s 
(1999b) assess the performance of 453 fund managers during 1992-1994, by grouping them 
into two categories, namely, those that belong to ―terminations‖ are the managers who 
stopped running their fund and do not re-appear as the manager of another fund, alternatively 
they re-emerge managing fewer assets, while those that belong to ―promotions‖, are those 
who stopped running a specific fund and re-emerge managing more total assets. Among their 
findings, they conclude that ―younger managers take on less unsystematic risk, and are less 
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likely to deviate from the herd than older managers.‖  Massa and Patgiri (2009), explain that 
through compensation incentives, fund managers are able to generate ‗superior performance‘, 
and that it is not only attributed to additional risk borne by managers but also to their abilities 
in ‗trading strategies‘ and ‗portfolio rebalancing‘. Indeed their results show that high 
incentive portfolios generate a return gap
5
 of 6 bps while low incentive portfolios generate a 
return gap of negative 4 bps during their sample period from 1996 to 2003.  
 The various strands of the fund performance literature has shown us that many factors 
come into play in determining performance and has given us ground to explore yet another 
variable which we believe has a direct relation and that is the effect of company visits on 
performance and whether it contributes positively to fund performance by giving fund 
manager an edge over their competitors. The next section outlines our hypotheses and our 
reasoning. 
 
4 Hypothesis  
 
Beginning our enquiry, we find that Glaum and Friedrich (2006), Moizer and Arnold‘s 
(1984), Chugh and Meador (1984), Holland and Doran (1998), Barker (1998), Pike et al 
(1993), Day (1986) have considered the importance of the visits paid by fund managers 
during their information collection process in building portfolios or just as a mechanism of 
checking up on the companies making up their portfolios. As Lee and Tweedie (1981) 
explain that ―this source of information is quite distinct from the other sources. Any 
information obtained during a visit to a company may well be unique in the sense that it may 
                                                          
5 The return gap is a measure introduced by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008),  Massa and Patgiri define it 
as ―the difference between the investor return and the buy-and-hold return from their disclosed portfolio‖. 
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not be shared by other investors (both existing and potential), whereas published sources 
provide knowledge for all users. Consequently, company visits would seem at first sight to be 
an extremely useful means of obtaining information in advance of other investors.‖ 
Accordingly, we reason that since company visits are rated as vital in the decision making 
process then this implies that these visits give fund managers knowledge and is a source of 
information that is highly advantageous and provides them with a wealth of information not 
available otherwise. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: 
The frequency of company visits conducted by fund managers has a positive effect on the 
performance of the funds they manage. 
 
In his inquiry into the existence of economies of scale in the management of mutual 
funds, Latzko (1999) clarifies that funds like other investment products have operating 
expenses; and that they typically consist of three major kinds of expenses which are paid 
from the fund‘s assets. The first type is the management fee paid to the fund's manager, as 
compensation for the expenses of portfolio management, namely, researching and setting up 
of the product. He continues that the magnitude of such management fee is a function of the 
annual performance of the product, therefore, the greater the return the larger the fee. In 
contrast, low performing products do not benefit from high fees.  Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu 
(2009) elaborate further by saying that fund fees are a function of the underlying cost for 
services provided in the form of managerial capabilities as well as cost of research and 
analysis. One of the explanations they offer is the ‗cost-based explanation‘ which holds that 
if larger fund operating expenses are due to  higher salaries being paid in order to attract and 
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retain better qualified fund managers then this results in a positive relation between 
performance and fees and serves to show existing and potential investors the quality of the 
fund. Alternatively, they posit that, factors such as economies of scale, learning economies, 
fund age reflecting its survival and a better management team  would render better decision 
making and an overall better portfolio management which result in lower fund expenses. As 
hypothesized above, we believe company visits are positively related to fund performance; 
nevertheless, they still represent costs to the manager in terms of time, money, and effort. 
The manager must forgo other duties, in order to conduct company visits; and often, the 
companies they visit require travelling, which presents their company with additional costs. 
Moreover, the fund manager must use his skills and abilities in order to engage and probe the 
employees at the investee companies. All of these contribute positively to the management 
fees charged. Therefore we hold that visits are a necessary component for them to offer those 
services. Thus,  
Hypothesis 2: 
The number of company visits conducted by fund managers is positively related to the 
management fees charged. 
 
 One interpretation Golec (1996) gives of portfolio turnover is that a high frequency   
of portfolio turnover entails high costs which are necessary for ―return-producing input by 
fund managers‖. Moreover, Trueman (1988) explains in his paper, a fund manager's value is 
partly determined by the amount the fund(s) under his management trades and that greatly 
relies on the rate at which new information is made sense of and the accuracy of such 
information. He goes on to explain if indeed the obtaining of new information and 
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subsequent trading on it indicates to investors the superior skills of the manager, then the 
investment manager will be motivated to trade more in order to gain more clients. He cites 
Kanodia, Bushman and Dickhaut (1986) and Trueman (1986) saying that they "show that 
agents may take actions that increase investor's perceptions of their ability to collect 
information". In their results, Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) find that expenses significantly 
reduce risk-adjusted excess return while turnover carries a positive sign when it is in the 
same equation, implying that the presence of high expenses with low turnover signifies 
"managerial slack", alternatively, the presence of high expense and high turnover conveys the 
opposite that the high expenses are being used for "research" purposes which results in more 
trading activity.  
Thus, 
Hypothesis 3: 
The number of company visits conducted by fund managers is positively related to the 
portfolio turnover. 
 




 The database is provided by Brockhouse Cooper, a research and advisory company 
specialized in providing structured and financially engineered solutions that meet the needs 
of the investment community at large. They offer standard advisory services, composed of 
investment consulting, asset management, transition management, securities trading, and 
global macro research.  The Brockhouse Cooper Team systematically and periodically 
evaluate and re-evaluate, managerial attributes, fund performance, and risk characteristics of 
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investment management firms globally comparing their performance and usually 
benchmarking such performances. Their database is international comprised of data on 
Canadian, US, EAFE, and global equity funds. It holds figures on around 5,000 products 
from 1,300 different firms
6
. From this database, we extract data on all Canadian Equity, 
small capitalization and mid capitalization funds. We also obtain data on all U.S. large, 
small, mid, and mix of small and mid (smid) capitalization funds listed in the data base. 
Quarterly data were collected from the period March 2008 to March 2011, giving us an initial 
sample of 247 Canadian funds of which, 49 were classified as small caps with the 198 
remaining as equity funds with 741 observations . The US sample gave us an initial sample 
of 1843, of which 491 were small caps, 949 were large caps, and the remaining 247 were mid 
cap and 156 were smid cap with 5529 observations. Our sample is of particular interest since 
its inception which is the first quarter of 2008 is at the onset of the liquidity crunch; therefore 
as Gottesman and Morey (2006) explain, and driven by the incentives literature, the fund 
manager‘s skill would be explained better than if it was during an expansionary period.   In 
conducting our research, we make use of multiple indicators of performance, human capital 
characteristics, and fund characteristics, therefore, for all funds in our sample, we obtained 
the 4 year Jensen's alpha, the excess return, the 4 year Sharpe ratio, the 4 year beta, team size, 
manager experience, manager turnover, employee equity ownership, and company visits. We 
further got the fund's total institutional assets under management, portfolio turnover, the 
average number of securities held in the portfolio, the dividend yield, the market to book 
ratio, and the annual returns. Next, we calculate the fund age by subtracting the year the first 
account was launched from the fund year in our sample, namely the first quarter in which it is 





taken in. We specify that each fund has at least 12 months worth of data therefore all funds 
that were younger than 1 year were excluded. In determining the management fees for each 
fund, we had at our disposal 2 fee schedules; one pertained to commingled accounts while 
the other was for segregated accounts. We referred to the segregated fee schedule because we 
enquired with a representative at Brockhouse Cooper and were informed that the majority of 
funds had segregated accounts. We, therefore, use an average of the percentage charged, 
since they were listed in 3 ranges and we proceed by multiplying the resulting percentage 
with the fund's total institutional assets under management. Finally, we form a dummy 
variable for small and mid capitalization funds, with the variable taking on a value of 1 if the 
funds were small or midcap and zero otherwise, note here that there were funds that had a 
'not defined' market capitalization description among the large cap funds, we assumed them 
to be 'all cap' and therefore they took on the value of zero. After merging the performance 
variables, the human capital variables, and the fund characteristics variables for the Canadian 
data, and making the necessary changes such as deleting observations where team size, fund 
assets under management, average number of securities held, and price to book ratio were 
zero, we were left with a final Canadian sample of 205 funds with 601 observations. A 
similar procedure was performed for the US sample which gave us a final sample of 938 
funds with 2720 observations. 
 
5.2 Methodology  
As Golec (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Gottesman and Morey (2006) and 
Switzer and Huang (2007) did before us, we set up our data so that for all the dependent 
variables, namely, the performance variables, the fees and the betas are taken in year t, while 
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all the manager characteristics and action and the fund characteristics as well as the annual 
returns which proxy for momentum are taken in year t – 1. It is important to note here that we 
considered our fund years from March to March, therefore, all variables assumed the first 
quarter of each year as the year end except for the portfolio turnover variable which assumed 
a calendar year end.  We use this approach so as to be able to discern the effects of manager‘s 
behavior since it is not immediately apparent.  The rationale for the model we use in testing 
the relationship between the various characteristics of fund managers and their actions, and 
performance, risk and management fees of Canadian and US equity funds, follows Golec 
(1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Gottesman and Morey (2006) and Switzer and 
Huang (2007) and it also incorporates aspects of the dynamic model proposed in Holland‘s 
(2002) CIMA report. Although the latter‘s model was constructed to include all variables that 
would aid fund managers in governance processes, it is nevertheless, still applicable for our 
purposes since it takes human capital variables into account. The model consists of 3 parts, 
the first one is human capital and structural capital which includes management specific 
variables such as experience, team size, manager turnover, as well as governance variables 
such as employee equity ownership; the second part consists of the fund managers actions 
which includes the frequency of contact with companies, the main variable the affects of 
which we are testing in this thesis, the third part includes fund characteristics, namely size, 
age, turnover, average number of securities held, and as documented by  Fama and French 
(1993), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997), we add the book to market ratio, 
the momentum factor and a dummy variable for small and mid capitalization funds. The 
following section defines the variables used. 
1) Human capital and structural capital: 
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Experience: is defined as the fund manager's investment experience. It might be a good 
indication of skill and know-how since the longer the fund manager has been in the industry, 
the higher his experience level and some like Golec (1996) might argue the less risk averse 
he becomes because job security becomes less of an issue. Golec (1996) uses manager age as 
an indication of experience and one argument he offers is that the older a manager gets, the 
higher fees he charges and the lower the portfolio turnover due to "negative impact of age on 
stamina". Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) also conclude that "younger managers take on less 
unsystematic risk than older managers". Switzer and Huang (2007) find that experience of 
the fund manager is positively related to both fund beta and expenses and a negative 
association between experience of the fund manager and portfolio turnover. In our study, we 
expect experience to have positive impact on the management fees, portfolio turnover, and 
on the amount of risk taken. 
Team size: is defined as number of people involved in mandate. This variable indicates 
whether having one fund manager making decisions produces better results as opposed to 
having more than one fund manager. Both Golec (1996) and Khorana et al (2007) do not find 
a significant relation between team size and performance. In their paper on restrictions clause 
in mutual funds, Almazan et al (2004) elaborate on the link between the amount of risk taken 
by fund managers and their age as well as whether the fund is individually or team managed. 
They explain that those funds with a single manager in charge are more likely to have ‗career 
concerns‘ since they are the sole bearers of responsibility of the fund‘s performance. On the 
other hand, team-managed funds will have it easier since it is more difficult to point fingers 
in case of bad performance.  Therefore, we expect team size to have a positive relation to 
both management fees and turnover since naturally, as more people are devoting their skills; 
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the more management fees are charged and the more managers conducting research and 
compiling information, the more they will trade. 
Manager turnover: is a measure of the frequency of change in fund managers since the 
inception date of the fund. Although we do not take change of fund manager into account, 
however, through the inclusion of manager turnover rate in percentage, we can have a history 
of manager turnover in fund management companies and see its affects on performance, fees 
and risk. Khorana (1996), in his study of manager turnover, finds that a fund manager who is 
about to be removed from his fund displays higher portfolio turnover and consequently 
higher expense and lower performance. Moreover, he argues that those managers engage in 
more risk taking behavior. Where Khorana (1996) relates managerial turnover to preceding 
fund performance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) test the effects in the following period in 
order to show whether more money is being directed towards a fund that just changed its 
manager; they find that manager turnover does not have a huge impact on inflow of funds. 
We expect manager turnover to be positively related to the three performance measures since 
previous managers may have been dismissed due to bad performance. Moreover, we expect it 
to reduce both systematic risk and portfolio turnover since the opposite behavior prior to 
removal was documented by Khorana (1996). 
Employee equity ownership: is defined, as stated by Khorana et al (2007), ―how much of 
their personal wealth is invested in the funds they manage‖. They find that managerial 
ownership has a positive impact on performance and conclude that having personal stake tied 
to the fund(s) under his or her management is a positive motivator for fund managers. 
Moreover, an interesting point they make is that ―managers simply have superior information 
with respect to the expected performance of the funds they manage and purchase shares in 
27 
 
the funds they expect to outperform.‖ Therefore, we expect employee equity ownership to 
have a positive effect on performance, beta and turnover. 
2) Fund managers‘ actions: 
Company visits: is defined as the frequency of fund managers‘ contact with companies and it 
is recorded as of the inception date of the fund. In line with previous literature discussed on 
the topic, we expect visits to be positively related to performance, management fees and 
turnover since the more visits conducted by fund managers, the more information they can 
extract about the company, leading them to trade more. In turn, a higher management fee is 
charged for the extra costs and efforts. 
3) Fund characteristics:  
Fund age: is an indication of the fund‘s endurance, reputation, and fidelity of its investors 
(Golec (1996)). It is computed as the year the first account was launched from the fund year 
in our sample, namely the first quarter in which it is taken in. Golec (1996) finds that fund 
age is positively associated with beta, and negatively related to management fees. Similarly 
Malhotra and Mcleod (1997) also find that older funds reduce expense due to ‗greater 
operating efficiency‘. Following along those lines, we expect fund age to be negatively 
related to fees, positively related both systematic risk and performance since more risk entails 
higher returns and thus more of a chance for survival.  
Fund size which is measured as the natural logarithm of a fund‘s total institutional assets 
under management, is an indication of its ―market acceptance, past growth, and economies of 
scale‖ Golec (1996). Though he does not find significant results between both performance 
28 
 
and turnover and fund, he does, however, find that fund size has a negative impact on 
management fees, supporting the reasoning that as fund size grows, the prorated impact of 
expenses when allocated among a large asset base thus reduces as a percentage the amount of 
management fees and other expenses charged. Switzer and Huang (2007) show a negative 
association between each of their performance, expense, and turnover equations and fund 
size and a positive association between fund size and beta. Fama and French (1993) examine 
various factors that have a determining role in average returns of stocks and among their 
findings they document that size has a negative impact on returns. Therefore, we expect that 
fund size will be negatively related to performance, and portfolio turnover, and positively 
related to beta.   
Number of securities held: is the average number of stocks held in a portfolio. In our data 
there was a minimum number and maximum number of securities that can be held in each 
fund, we therefore took an average of the 2 numbers. Sapp and Yan (2008) report in their 
study of focused funds that the number of securities held in a fund has a positive impact on 
performance, and that ―funds with a large number of holdings significantly outperform funds 
with a small number of holdings both before and after expenses.‖ Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) also include number of securities held in their tests of the value of active management 
and they find that they have a positive effect on fund performance. We expect number of 
securities held to be associated with more exposure to systematic risk, higher management 
fees, and higher turnover.  
Fund Beta: also known as non-diversifiable risk, is defined in the Brockhouse Cooper 
database as, "the sensitivity or the responsiveness of the fund‘s excess return to that of the 
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market portfolio.‖ Since a fund manager has no control over market movements, then the 
level of systematic risk he/she is exposed to and the subsequent performance of the fund(s) 
indicate the manager's ability of how well he/she can predict this risk and choose stocks that 
are more or less risky according to their risk objectives. As explained by Elton, Gruber, 
Brown and Goetzman, in their book, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, 
―stocks are thought of as being more or less risky than the market, according to whether their 
beta is larger or smaller than 1‖ (Elton et al, 2007). We consider beta as a dependent variable 
in the systematic risk equation, to see how the variables in the specification of the equation 
are related to systematic risk. We also consider it as an independent variable in the 
performance equations to see how it affects performance. 
Portfolio turnover: is indicative of the amount of trading activity undertaken by the fund 
manager. Both Switzer and Huang (2007) and Golec (1996), report that there is a positive 
association between turnover and beta, however, they finds no significant relation between 
turnover and alpha. Carhart (1997) shows a negative relation between turnover and alpha. 
We predict that portfolio turnover would have a positive effect on performance, management 
fees, and beta. Portfolio turnover is also tested as a dependent variable. 
The book to market ratio: is commonly known as the ratio of the book value of a firm‘s 
common stock to its market value. Fama and French (1993) find that the book to market ratio 
has significant weight in accounting for the average returns on stocks, therefore, we include 
book to market ratio as a control variable in the performance equations to capture ‗relative 
earnings performance‘.  
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Dividend yield: is also another variable evidenced in the literature to have weight in 
explaining average stock returns, therefore, we include it as a control variable in the 
performance equations.   
The capitalization dummy variable was added to control for the small and mid capitalization 
objective of the funds in the Canadian and US samples. It takes on the value of 1 if it is a 
small or mid capitalization fund and zero otherwise. Including this variable in the regressions 
allows us to see explicitly the effects of small and mid capitalization firms on beta, 
management fees, and turnover. Small caps have been a source of interest among 
academicians due to their ability to produce higher performance than their large cap 
counterparts. Switzer and Huang (2007) show a negative association between both beta and 
expenses and mid capitalization funds. We predict a negative relation between small and mid 
capitalization funds and the systematic risk, management fees and portfolio turnover.  
The Momentum factor, as evidenced by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is considered as the 
annualized 1 year return of the fund during the period  t – 1.  
The following three performance measures used
7
: 
4 year Sharpe ratio: is one of the risk-adjusted performance measures we employ. It is a 
measure of performance taking into account the relation between the fund‘s excess return and 
its standards deviation. As Sharpe (1966) explained, ―It is the reward provided the investor 
for bearing risk‖. This measure gives us a good indication of performance since it takes the 
relation between total risk and excess return into account. We use it as an independent 
                                                          
7
 Note that all performance measures were already calculated in the database used. 
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variable in the management fee equation to see whether performance raises or lowers the 
amount of fees charged. 
4 year Jensen‘s alpha: is another risk-adjusted performance measure we utilize, it is defined 
in the Brockhouse Cooper database as, ―the average difference between the return of the 
manager and the return of a passive strategy of equal market absolute risk.‖ Namely, Jensen‘s 
alpha as introduced by Jensen (1968) shows the returns achieved by a fund manager taking 
into account systematic risk and expected return on the market portfolio. A positive alpha 
shows that a fund manager has outperformed the market while a negative one shows the 
opposite. Similar to the Sharpe ratio, Jensen‘s alpha is also used as an independent variable 
in the management fee equation for the same reason.     
Excess return: is the fund‘s excess return over an appropriate benchmark, matched according 
to market capitalization therefore, the Canadian small cap uses the Nesbitt Burns Small Cap 
index as its benchmark, while Canadian equity uses the S&P/TSX as its benchmark. The US 
large capitalization funds use the Russell 1000 Growth, Russell 1000 value; while the mid 
capitalization funds use the Russell Mid-Cap Growth, Russell Mid-Cap value; finally the 
small capitalization funds use Russell 2000 Growth, Russell 2000 Value. 
In conducting the analysis, our endeavor begins with preliminary tests of manager 
characteristics and actions versus fund characteristics. We then use 2 main methodologies, 
namely, a heteroscedasticity consistent ordinary least squares approach and a three stage least 
square estimation procedure similar to Golec (1996), Switzer and Huang (2007) and 




5.2.1 Heteroscedasticity robust OLS procedure: 
Since we are examining cross-sectionally at how the manager actions and characteristics 
affect performance, risk, and management fees, there may be a problem of heteroscedasticity 
in the error terms thus affecting the standard error of the co-efficient estimations leading us 
to less than accurate results. We correct for this potential problem by testing the effect of 
each independent variable on the dependent variable by setting it to zero. This procedure is 
first performed in testing fund characteristics against manager characteristics and actions in 
similar fashion to Chevalier and Ellison (1999a). The following equations are utilized: 
 
 
Next, using the same method, we perform the main regressions of our study, which we also 








We employ one measure of systematic risk exposure of the fund: 
 
 




5.2.2 Three stage least square procedure: 
We then conduct a three stage least square estimation procedure like Golec (1996), Switzer 
and Huang (2007) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), because the dependent variables we are 
testing are all interrelated and may affect each other simultaneously. The three stage least 
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squares procedure begins by using the instrumental variables which we have specified to 
generate ‗predict values‘ for the endogenous variables (portfolio turnover, 4 yr alpha, Sharpe 
ratio, excess return, 4 yr beta, and management fees), next regressions are run using the 
‗predicted values‘ in order to generate the residuals which are used in the third stage to build 
a covariance matrix and produce accurate estimates. In line with this procedure, we set up the 
equations so that they fulfill the order and rank condition, that is we make sure that each 
equation in the system is either over-identified or exactly-identified by specifying each 
equation so that the total number of exogenous variables that were excluded were greater 
than or equal to the number of endogenous variables on the right hand side of the equation. In 
this paper, we treat all the dependent variables as endogenous, because performance of the 
fund is affected by the systematic risk exposure of the fund and the fees charged which are in 
turn affected by portfolio turnover, therefore, we test the previously stated equations, three 
times using a different performance equation in the system each time.    
6 Empirical Estimation of Canadian sample 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1, shows the simple statistics of our sample, which have assets 
under management ranging from CAD $420,000 to CAD $18.5 billion, reflecting our sample 
of small capitalization funds to large capitalization funds. We can see that the mean beta is 
0.9, suggesting that the average equity fund in our sample underperforms the market. Further 
indicated by the performance measures which show that the average Jensen‘s alpha was -  
0.18, the average excess return was -0.27, while the average Sharpe ratio was -0.023, 
reflective of the recessionary period the study takes place in. The average team size is around 
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6 people while the average investment experience level of the fund managers is about 17 
years. Noteworthy are the minimum and the maximum experience levels, 2 and 48 years 
respectively indicating that there are both really young and inexperienced fund managers 
along with really experienced old managers. The different lengths of experience imply 
different risk levels, fee levels and general behavior. Company visits range from no visits at 
all to 3000 visits since the inception of the fund which shows the differing sentiments of the 
importance of company visits among fund managers in the industry. The average number of 
securities held was around 58 with 10.5 being the minimum and 650 being the maximum. 
The average fund age in our sample is about 17 years. The portfolio turns over at an average 
of 61 % per year while turnover of key managers averages to about 27% since the inception 
date of the fund. Finally, the management fees charged in our sample ranges from 0.03% to 
5.2%. 
***insert Table 1 panel A about here*** 
6.2 correlation matrix 
The Pearson correlations are presented in Table 2. We can observe from Panel A of Table 
2, that there is a 28% positive correlation between visits and team size, indicating that the 
larger the team size, the more company visits are conducted; since number of visits can be 
allocated among more managers, this should have a positive impact on performance. This is 
in line with our proposition that the higher the number of visits, the higher the probability 
that they will catch on information not available to others. Next we find, that employee 
equity ownership has a positive 22% and a negative 17% correlation with investment 
experience and visits respectively signifying that ownership of part of the fund by its 
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manager(s) does not cause a manager(s) to rate visits as important. Moreover, we find that 
portfolio turnover has a positive correlation of 18% and 37% with Jensen‘s alpha and beta 
respectively, demonstrating that the higher portfolio turnover is the higher its performance 
and the higher the level of systematic risk taken. On the other hand, portfolio turnover has a 
negative correlation of 29% with fund age implying that older funds are less active than 
younger funds. Next we find a positive correlation of 45% between management fees and 
team size and a 25% negative correlation between management fees and turnover; while a 
44% positive correlation between management fees and fund age implying that older funds 
may also have older fund managers who require higher fees due to years of experience and 
superior skills. Finally, we find that the log of fund assets has a 31% positive correlation 
between both team size and fund age suggesting that growth of the fund comes with age and 
the number of people involved in decision making. We also find a negative correlation of 
26% between the log of fund assets and portfolio turnover, implying that as the fund grows, it 
trades less. Additionally, there is a 64% positive correlation between management fees and 
the log of fund assets, due to the magnitude of the correlation; we omitted this variable from 
the fee equation to avoid problems of multicolinearity.  
 
***insert Table 2 Panel A about here*** 
 
6.3 Heteroscedasiticity Consistent OLS results of fund characteristics versus manager 
characteristics and actions 
37 
 
Much like chevalier and Ellison (1999a) and Gottesman and Morrey (2006), Panel A of 
table 3 presents an initial analysis of fund characteristics versus manager characteristics and 
actions for the Canadian Sample. The table shows model 1 and model 2 for each equation 
with model 1, presenting the inclusion of the capitalization dummy and model 2 presenting 
the equation without the capitalization dummy to discern the effects of small and mid cap 
funds. The interpretations of this table focuses on the results including the capitalization 
dummy, that is model 1, unless there is a significant difference, we limit our comments to the 
former. In terms of management fees charged by the fund, we find that team size is positive 
and significant at the 1% level; therefore a 1 % increase in team size is associated with 0.51 
% increase in management fees. Contrary to expectations, there is a negative relation 
between visits and management fees at the 5% level of significance. We also find that small 
caps have a negative and significant impact on management fees at the 1% level meaning 
that managers at small caps have a lower compensation than their large cap counterparts. 
The portfolio turnover equation is negatively associated with both team size and 
investment experience at the 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. This shows that 
team size does not translate into more trading activity by fund managers. Moreover, our 
findings of the negative association between experience and portfolio turnover are consistent 
with Switzer and Huang (2007) and as explained by Golec (1996), it may indicate that older 
fund managers may be less motivated to prove themselves since they have less time left till 
retirement.  
The fifth column demonstrates a positive relation between team size and log of fund 
assets equation indicating that as more people become in charge of managing a fund, they 
38 
 
contribute positively to the growth of fund assets. Moreover, the positive and significant 
relation between visits and fund size at the 10% level implies that the more visits conducted 
to the companies of the securities comprising the fund; the more valuable information is 
collected for decision making and growth of the fund. Next, we find a negative relation 
between investment experience and log of fund assets which is analogous to Chevalier and 
Ellison‘s (1999a) finding that older managers are associated with smaller funds. We find 
further, that there is a negative and significant association between manager turnover and 
fund size at the 5% level, meaning that frequency of change in management has adverse 
effects on fund size. As Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) elaborate, the resulting effects of 
managerial turnover serve to show the response of institutional investors. Clearly, we can see 
that they reacted negatively by limiting magnitude of investments to the fund thus reducing it 
in size.  
Finally, consistent with Switzer and Huang (2007) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) the 
systematic risk equation shows a positive relation between investment experience and betas, 
suggesting that more experienced investors take on more risk, however this is only in the 
case when we exclude the capsize dummy. On the other hand, the results also show a 
negative association between employee ownership and beta, implying that more ownership 
reduces the systematic risk exposure of the fund managers. This is an indication that as 
employee equity ownership increases, fund managers become more risk averse since their 
personal stake is now tied to the fund.  
 




The preliminary results show that human capital characteristics and actions do have 
an effect on various fund characteristics. In summary, we find contrary to our expectations 
that company visits is negatively related to management fees while positively related to fund 
size. Team size is positively related to management fees and fund size while negatively 
related to trading activity. The fund manager‘s investment experience is negatively related to 
both portfolio turnover and fund size. Finally ownership is negatively related to beta while 
managerial turnover is negatively related to fund size. 
6.4 Heteroscedasiticity consistent OLS results of performance, risk, and fees equations 
For the main tests of this paper, we conduct all the regressions using 2 methodologies, 
namely, a heteroscedasticity consistent OLS regressions and 3SLS regressions in order to 
account for simultaneity of the dependent variables. Focusing our attention on the 
performance equations in Panel A of table 4, we find that beta is positively and significantly 
related to excess returns therefore, the more risk borne by the investor, the higher the returns.  
Our next finding shows that manager turnover is also positively and significantly related to 
excess returns at the 5% level. The result is consistent with our reasoning that when a low 
performing fund manager is replaced by a more skillful manager than this would positively 
affect performance.  In terms of the value added by human capital and actions, we cannot 
ascertain much from the OLS results of the performance equations except that manager 
turnover positively affects excess returns.  
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The OLS results of the systematic risk equation shows that portfolio turnover, number 
of securities held in the portfolio and fund age have a positive impact on beta at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. These findings suggest that the trading activity of the manager 
increases the fund‘s systematic risk; that the number of securities held in a portfolio increases 
the systematic risk of that portfolio, although very marginally; and consistent with Golec 
(1996) older funds are more experienced and are not afraid to take on more risk. Finally, as 
expected manager turnover has a significant and negative impact on beta at the 5% level, 
following Khorana‘s (1996) reasoning that fund managers appear to increase systematic risk 
prior to being replaced therefore, the new manager  would most likely hold less risk. Finally, 
similar to Switzer and Huang (2007), the small and mid capitalization dummy was negatively 
related to beta suggesting that small and mid cap funds have lower betas. 
The portfolio turnover equation shows that investment experience, team size and fund 
size are negatively and significantly related to the trading activity of the fund. While, as 
expected, number of securities held has a positive impact on portfolio turnover though it is 
not significant. Contrary to our expectations but in line with Switzer and Huang (2007), 
every additional year of investment experience reduces turnover by 1.26%. Similarly, we 
find that fund size is also negatively related to turnover at the 1% level of significance.   
The management fee equation, is done 3 separate times using a different performance 
measure each time. Contrary to our expectations, the results of all three management fee 
equations show that portfolio turnover and company visits are negatively and significantly 
related to management fees at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. This implies that 
management fees are reduced by trading activity, this result is counterintuitive since we hold 
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that more trading activity by a fund entails higher expenses and in the same token higher 
management fees, however, perhaps due to an effort on fund managers‘ part to decrease 
expenses they may reduce fees. On the other hand, team size and fund age have a positive 
impact on management fees both at the 1% level, therefore, as more people manage a fund 
the more salaries are paid out, hence the higher the management fees. Also, as explained 
earlier, older funds may have older fund managers who require higher compensation for their 
services. The capitalization dummy also has a negative impact on the fee equations in line 
with our preliminary findings that small and mid capitalization managers have lower 
compensation compared to large cap funds since fees are paid out of fund assets therefore the 
smaller capitalization fund would pay less.  
***insert Table 4 Panel A about here*** 
As a wrap up to table 4a, we can conclude that as funds age, they have a positive and 
significant impact on beta and management fees at the 10% and 1% levels of significance 
respectively. Moreover, as their team size grow in number, they charge higher management 
fees and slow down trading activity. We also find that trading activity of the funds in our 
sample have a positive effect on beta and the opposite effect on fees. Finally, we find 
company visits conducted by the fund managers reduces management fees. 
6.5 Three stage least squares results of performance, risk , and  fee equations 
The 3sls equations are performed 3 separate times using a different performance 
measure. Focusing on Panel A of table 5, where the system uses excess return as the 
performance measure, we find that in line with Trueman‘s (1988) reasoning and Golec‘s 
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(1996) findings, the systematic risk equation shows that portfolio turnover is positively and 
significantly related to risk at the 1% level, similarly, investment experience has positive and 
significant impact on beta as well as ownership, number of securities held, and fund age. As 
expected, the more a portfolio turns over, the more the fund manager is trading which implies 
greater systematic risk. In the same vein the greater the number of securities held, suggests 
more positions taken by each security in the fund, which in turn implies greater risk. 
Moreover, employee equity ownership also shows a positive and significant association with 
beta at the 5% level which supports the incentive alignment argument that the greater a fund 
manager‘s or the equity team‘s personal interests are tied to the fund under their 
management, the more he will want to achieve superior performance thus causing him to take 
on more systematic risk. Fund age also appears to have a positive and significant effect on 
beta at the 1% level, supporting Golec‘s (1996) reasoning that taking on more systematic risk 
increases a fund‘s chances of superior performance, thereby increasing the fund‘s longevity. 
Finally, similar to Switzer and Huang (2007) and in contrast to Golec (1996), fund size 
displays a positive relation to beta. 
Moving on to the turnover equation, we find that experience has adverse effects on 
portfolio turnover suggesting that as fund managers become more experienced, they reduce 
trading activity in an effort to reduce expenses, however, it is not significant. Next, consistent 
with expectations, we find that the number of securities held is positively and significantly 
related to turnover at the 5% level. Finally, we find that fund assets have a negative impact 
on turnover, which suggests lower activity by the fund as it grows. Finally, the 3SLS results 
for the management fee equation show that turnover has a negative and significant impact on 
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fees charged, while team size and fund age have a positive impact at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively.  
Panel B of table 5 presents the system using Jensen‘s alpha as the performance 
measure. The results for the systematic risk equation, are qualitatively similar to the previous 
system using excess returns. We find that the turnover equation is also similar qualitatively to 
the previous system, however, with different magnitudes. Finally in the management fees 
equation, portfolio turnover becomes insignificant while team size and fund age continue to 
have a positive and significant impact on fees as in the previous system. 
The results for the system using the Sharpe ratio as the performance measure are 
presented in Panel C of table 5. We find that the price to book ratio has a negative effect on 
performance at the 1% level. Additionally, in this system we find that dividend yield and 
momentum are positively and significantly related at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. For 
the systematic risk equation, the results are qualitatively the same as the previous 2 systems. 
The turnover equation also displays similar results as the previous two; with frequency of 
company visits becoming significant at the 10% level. The management fees equation shows 
similar results to the first system, namely that turnover has a negative and significant effect 
while team size and fund age have a positive effect on management fees suggesting that older 
funds charge higher to reflect their prestige, and perhaps they are managed by older 
managers who also charge higher fees for their services. 
***insert Table 5 Panel A, B, C about here*** 
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 A summary of the 3 stage least squares results indicates that for all three systems 
employing different variables for performance, the following human capital characteristics 
and fund characteristics, that is, investment experience, employee equity ownership, average 
number of securities held, fund age, and log of fund assets, positively  and significantly 
impact the fund‘s beta. Moreover, fund age and team size positively affect management fees 
in all three systems while portfolio turnover has a negative effect, in the systems using the 
excess returns and the Sharpe ratios as the performance measures. The main variable we are 
interested in becomes significant and positively affects trading activity in the system using 
the Sharpe ratio.   Finally, the results show that the average number of securities held has a 
positive impact on portfolio turnover, while log of fund assets have the opposite effect in all 
three systems.    
7 Empirical Estimation of US sample 
7.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we will be conducting an analysis of the US results. Therefore, panel 
B of table 1 shows the simple statistics of the US sample. Since our US sample consists of 4 
categories of funds namely, large capitalization, small, capitalization, mid capitalization, and 
a mix of small and mid capitalization, we can see that assets under management range from 
CAD$40,000 to about CAD $90 billion. We can observe that the average beta is 0.938, like 
in the Canadian sample; the US sample is less risky than the market. Looking at the 3 
performance measures, we can see that excess return has an average of -0.266% while, 
Jensen‘s alpha has an average of -0.143% and the Sharpe ratio has an average of -0.41%, 
leading us to conclude that they underperformed the market during the 2009 to 2011 period. 
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Next we can see that team size ranges from a single manager to a managing team of 39. 
Moreover, similar to the Canadian sample, the experience levels of US fund managers in our 
sample range from 4 years to 49 years. The minimum number of visits is zero while the 
maximum is 10,000 giving us an average of 521 visits since the inception of the fund. 
Employee equity ownership also has an average of 54% ownership, while number of 
securities held in a portfolio averages 95 securities. The average fund age of our US sample 
is about 13 years old with the oldest fund being about 85 years old and the youngest 1.25 
years old, giving us a sample of well established funds to novice funds. Portfolio turnover 
averaged about 81.5% per year; moreover, manager turnover averaged 33% with the 
maximum being 3300% since the inception date of the funds, indicating that some of the 
investment advisory firms of the fund managers had a huge change in management. 
Furthermore, dividend yield averaged 1.64% with the maximum being 63.27% and the 
minimum being 0% while the management fees being charged averaged to 0.67% with the 
minimum being 0.004% and the maximum being 8.3%.     
  
***insert Table 1 Panel B about here*** 
 
7.2  correlation matrix 
Table 2, panel B presents the correlation matrix of all the variables in our sample, 
some noteworthy observations include the positive 18.8% correlation between employee 
equity ownership and investment experience indicating that a more experienced fund 
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manager is more likely to have a stake in the funds he is managing or that is managed in his 
investment advisory firm. We find a positive 29% correlation between the management fees 
charged and the fund age indicating that older funds are more prestigious and charge more 
for their services. We also find a negative 17% correlation between portfolio turnover and 
fund age indicating that as funds age, they tend to trade less. Moreover, the results show a 
35% correlation between fund size fund age meaning that age contributes to the size of the 
fund and a 20% positive correlation between fund size and team size meaning that as funds 
grow so does the managing team. Finally we find that in our sample there is a 27% 
correlation between the capitalization dummy and the Sharpe ratio which is the highest 
amongst the other performance measure which are correlated at about 11% and 17% for 
excess return and Jensen‘s alpha respectively. There is also a negative 24% correlation 
between the capitalization dummy and the dividend yield indicating that small and mid 
capitalization funds reduce dividend payout. 
***insert Table 2 Panel B about here*** 
 
7.3 Heteroscedasiticity Consistent OLS results of fund characteristics versus manager 
characteristics and actions 
Next, we do initial tests using only human capital characteristics and actions to 
discern its effects on various fund characteristics. In terms of management fees charged, 
panel B of table 3 shows that team size, investment experience, and frequency of visits, all 
have a positive impact at the 1% level; while manager turnover, employee equity ownership 
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and the small capitalization dummy have a negative impact at the 1% level. These results are 
consistent with expectations since the more people managing a fund, the more salaries are 
being paid, moreover, the higher a fund manager‘s experience level, the more compensation 
he will demand for his services, and we argue that company visits are essential however 
present both the fund manager and his management firm with additional costs in terms of 
money, time, and effort. Manager turnover has a negative impact on fees charged, it may be 
due to a number of reasons, one of which is that the new manager taking the place of the 
previous one may reduce his systematic risk in order to make up for the bad performance of 
the previous manager, therefore, he will reduce expenses for the fund to survive, thus 
reducing fees. We also find employee equity ownership has a negative impact on fees 
charged. Finally, as determined in the correlation matrix, the small capitalization funds have 
a negative impact on fees. 
Focusing our attention on portfolio turnover, we find that similar to the Canadian 
sample, team size and experience have a negative effect on trading activity. Given our 
sample period, it is expected that the more experienced managers would want to trade less 
during market downturns. Manager turnover and ownership also has a negative and 
significant impact on portfolio turnover implying that as team size is reduced due to 
departure or firing of a manager, less trading is going on in comparison to before. Moreover, 
as stated for the fee equation, the negative association of ownership and turnover may be due 
to the time period of our study. On the other hand, frequency of company visits positively 
and significantly affects portfolio turnover at the 5% level in line with our reasoning, that the 
more visits fund managers conduct, the more wealth of information they have at their 
disposal, leading them to trade more. 
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Next, we find that team size and visits are significantly and positively related to fund 
size at the 1% level, signifying that the more people managing a fund results in a positive 
contribution to the growth of the fund, moreover, frequency of visits seems to have the same 
effect in our US sample. In contrast, ownership continues to display a negative impact on 
fund characteristics.  
Finally as a wrap up to this section, we find that team size has a positive impact on 
beta at the 1% level, suggesting that the more fund managers in a team, the more trading 
activity, leading to more risk borne by the fund managers. 
***insert Table 3 Panel B about here*** 
According to the preliminary results, we find that some aspects of human capital do 
indeed impact various factors of the fund. We find that these initial results indicate that, team 
size has a positive and significant effect on fees, size, beta, and a negative effect on portfolio 
turnover. Investment experience has positive effect on management fees while the opposite 
effect on portfolio turnover. Company visits has a consistent positive effect wherever it is 
included, that is in the fees, turnover, and fund size equations. Finally manager turnover and 
employee equity ownership both have a negative and significant impact on fees, turnover, 
while employee equity ownership also has a negative effect on fund size.  
7.4 Heteroscedasiticity consistent OLS results of performance, risk, and fees equations 
We now examine the main regressions we are testing presented in panel B of table 4. 
The performance regression with Jensen‘s alpha as the dependent variable shows that 
turnover has a negative and significant impact on performance at the 5% level, while 
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management fees are found to be positively and significantly related to performance at the 
1% level supporting Golec‘s (1996) findings that the higher fees charged are due to more 
effort and research by fund managers as shown by the positive coefficient of visits although 
it is found to be insignificant. Moreover, similar to Switzer and Huang (2007), fund size is 
negatively and significantly related to performance. Management fees also have a positive 
and significant impact on the Sharpe ratio along with the frequency of company visits 
supporting our hypothesis that visits are positively related to performance. We also find that 
the beta is positively related to performance since higher risk is associated with higher 
performance. Similar to the previous performance equation, fund size has a negative impact 
on the Sharpe ratio while momentum, as documented in the literature has a positive effect on 
the performance of the fund. 
In the portfolio turnover equation, as expected we find that visits has a positive effect 
at the 1% level which supports the idea that through visits, fund managers have access to 
information not available otherwise, and the information extracted through these meetings 
triggers more trading activity as explained by Trueman (1988).  The average number of 
securities held in a portfolio and the small and mid capitalization dummy also have a positive 
impact  on turnover since, the more holdings a fund has, the more positions the securities 
take which results in higher turnover. We find that experience, team size and ownership all 
have a negative and significant relation to portfolio turnover, suggesting that experienced 
managers traded less during our sample period, number of managers in charge of a fund had 
adverse effects on turnover, and ownership did not demonstrate to be a method of incentive 
alignment in our sample. Manager turnover also displayed a negative and significant relation 
at the 5% level along with fund size at the 1% level. 
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Moving on to the systematic risk equation, we find that portfolio turnover had a 
positive impact on beta. In addition, we find that employee ownership also had a positive and 
significant effect on trading activity supporting the idea that the more stake fund managers 
have in the fund(s) they are managing, the more like they are to take risk to achieve higher 
performance. Small and mid capitalization had a negative impact on risk. 
Similar to the Canadian sample, we ran the fee equations three times using a different 
performance measure in the equation each time. They all had qualitatively similar results but 
with different magnitudes. We report that all three performance measures had a positive 
effect on fees which is consistent with expectations since higher performance charges higher 
management fees. Moreover, like the Canadian sample results, we find that turnover had a 
negative impact on fees. As expected, visits had a positive impact on fees along with team 
size, portfolio holdings and fund age leading us to conclude that as a fund ages and gains 
more prestige due to its survival and performance and as the number of securities held and 
team size grows, so do the management fees being charged.  
***insert Table 4 Panel B about here*** 
The heteroscedasticity consistent OLS results of the US sample shows us several 
major findings, first, it supports all three of our hypotheses that the frequency of company 
visits is positively related to performance as indicated by its positive effect on the Sharpe 
ratio, that it is also positively related to portfolio turnover at the 1% level of significance, and 
that it contributed positively to management fees since it represents additional costs. Next 
this table shows that human capital characteristics have a bearing on performance, risk and 
fees as demonstrated by the negative and significant impact of investment experience on 
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trading activity, the negative impact of team size on portfolio turnover and its positive impact 
on fees, and the negative impacts of both managerial turnover and employee equity 
ownership on the trading activity of the fund. 
7.5 Three stage least squares results of performance, risk , and  fee equations 
Finally, we run the regressions using the 3SLS methodology since we believe results 
would be better reflected when we take into account the endogeneity of the dependent 
variables. Looking at panel D of table 5, the system with excess return as the performance 
measure shows that beta negatively and significantly affects excess returns at the 1% level; 
portfolio turnover also has a similar negative effect at the 10% level of significance. Visits, 
on the other hand, have a positive and significant impact on performance at the 1% level of 
significance; while dividend yield have a negative and significant effect on the excess returns 
of the fund at the 10% level. Second, we find that portfolio turnover, investment experience, 
employee equity ownership, and fund size have a positive impact on beta at the 1% level of 
significance; implying that all human capital characteristics positively affect fund manager‘s 
risk taking along with average portfolio holdings which is significant at the 10% level, while 
the capitalization dummy has a negative and significant impact on beta. Next looking at the 
turnover equation, we find that visits, the average number of securities held and the 
capitalization have a positive impact on trading activity at the 1% level. These results suggest 
that frequency of company visits are a source of value added information since it causes fund 
managers to trade more, while an addition of a security in a portfolio leads to a 0.05% 
increase in trading. Moreover the significant capitalization dummy indicates that small and 
mid caps are 13.8% more active than their large cap counterparts. In contrast, investment 
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experience, employee equity ownership and fund assets have a negative and significant 
impact on portfolio turnover at the 1% level of significance.  
Shifting our attention to the fees equation we find that Performance and company 
visits are positively related to management fees at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. On the 
other hand, portfolio turnover, investment experience, and the capitalization dummy all have 
a negative impact on management fees.  
Similar to the excess return equation, the system with Jensen‘s alpha as the 
performance measure, panel E of table 5, shows that beta and dividend yield also have a 
negative effect on fund performance although dividend yield is not significant, however, 
management turnover becomes significant at the 10% level implying that a management firm 
with a long history of managerial turnover has a negative impact on performance. Moreover, 
as predicted, we find that frequency of visits is positively related to performance. Beta and 
portfolio turnover in this system, display similar results as the previous system, while in the 
management fee equation, fund age and team size become significant having a positive effect 
at 1% level, highlighting the idea that as funds age and as the managing team grows in size 
so do the management fees.  
Finally, in panel F of table 5, presenting the third system with the Sharpe ratio as the 
performance measure; we find that similar to the two previous systems, beta and dividend 
yield are negatively related to performance while visits has a positive and significant impact 
at the 1% level of significance. Moreover, we find that fund age has a negative impact on 
performance while momentum has a positive and significant impact at the 1% level. Beta and 
turnover have qualitatively similar results to the previous two systems and finally the results 
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for the management fee equation shows that, as in the previous system, performance does not 
affect fees charged, and the capitalization dummy is positive and significant in this system, 
therefore, small and mid capitalization funds charge 2.16% higher management fees than 
their large cap peers. 
***insert Table 5 Panel D, E, F about here*** 
 The three stage simultaneous equation method of estimation further emphasized the 
relevance of manager actions and characteristics by producing results that support our three 
hypotheses, namely that the frequency of company visits has positive and significant impact 
on all three performance measures and on the fees and systematic risk. Moreover, we find 
that investment experience consistently shows a positive relation to the beta of the fund while 
a negative and significant relation to both turnover and management fees, supporting 
Chevallier and Ellison (1999b) and Golec (1996) that older managers take on more risk, 
however, due to the negative effects of age, their funds display lower trading activity and 
thus lower fees. Managerial ownership also maintains a positive and significant association 
with beta while a negative association with trading activity, while average number of 
holdings is positively related to beta and portfolio turnover in all three systems. 
  
8 Summary and Conclusions  
 
Using a sample of 205 Canadian and 938 US equity funds during the period 2008 
through the first quarter of 2011, we examine how human capital characteristics and actions 
affect the performance, management fees and systematic risk of the funds. Specifically, we 
place a special emphasis on the frequency of company visits conducted by fund managers in 
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determining whether it contributes positively to the fund performance attributes. We seek to 
answer the question of whether company visits offer a source of value added information that 
fund managers can use in their company valuations and subsequent stock-picking since we 
hold that company visits provide fund managers with the a clearer picture of the companies 
comprising their funds and the long term goals. We employ 2 methodologies, the first which 
is the heteroscedasticity consistent ordinary least squares method since this is a cross-
sectional study, and the second methodology we utilize is the three stage least squares 
method since we hold that the performance, risk, and fees are all interrelated and affect one 
another.  
 Our tests on the Canadian sample show in the initial results that human capital 
characteristics do have an impact on various fund attributes. The variable of interest, 
company visits is negatively and significantly related to management fees, while it shows a 
positive and significant effect on fund size. Moreover, it has a negative effect on Jensen‘s 
alpha and the Sharpe ratio, and a positive effect on the excess returns although they are not 
significant. It becomes positive and affects trading activity in the 3sls systems employing the 
Sharpe ratio and excess returns as the performance measures although it is only significant in 
the former at the 10% level. The analysis and tests on the Canadian sample do not give us 
ground to make firm conclusions regarding the effects of company visits on performance and 
management fees including portfolio turnover, since results were not consistent. 
 
 The US sample showed in its initial results similar to that of Canadian funds, that 
human capital impacts various fund characteristics. Contrary to Canadian funds, we find that 
company visits, has a positive and significant impact on management fees, portfolio turnover 
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and fund size, showing support to our reasoning that visits increase management fees, since 
fund managers are contributing their time, effort and other costs in conducting these visits. 
Moreover, its positive effect on trading activity shows that they are being constantly updated 
by new information received through visits leading them to trade more; and its positive 
impact on fund size indicates its contribution to growth of the fund. Company visits are also 
significant in the OLS results having a positive impact on the Sharpe ratio, the portfolio 
turnover and the management fees. Finally, company visits have positive and significant 
effect on all the performance variables, management fees and portfolio turnover in the 3sls 
estimations. All this lends support to our hypotheses that company visits have a positive 
contributing factor to fund performance and fees, leading us to conclude that visits present a 
beneficial value to fund managers in managing portfolio. 
 
 Concluding this study, we have a picture of the differing behaviors of Canadian and 
US fund managers during the period of the first quarter of 2008 through the first quarter of 
2011. We conclude that US fund managers derive value enhancing information from 
company visits while in regards to Canadian fund managers, results are inconclusive, perhaps 
due to the small sample size, alternatively, it may be due to cultural differences between the 
US and Canada, demonstrating the weight US fund managers place on company visits 
relative to Canadian fund managers. Another possible explanation is that the industry 
composition of the investments differs between the US and Canada. Canadian portfolio 
managers would have greater exposure to the mining and oil and gas industries. Accordingly, 
company visits in these industries may be less relevant than other tangible factors, such as 
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Table 1: Sample Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of all the variables used in the study. The final sample 
includes 205 Canadian equity funds with 601 observations and 938 US equity funds with 2720 
observations. The fund performance measures include the excess returns, the 4 year Jensen‘s alpha, 
and the 4 yr Sharpe ratio all taken in year t, while all the human capital characteristics, namely, team 
size, investment experience in years, employee equity ownership (%), manager turnover (%), and 
frequency of visits are taken in year t – 1. The 4 year Beta captures the systematic risk of the funds. 
The rest of the variables are fund characteristics variables, that is, the fund‘s total institutional assets 
under management (in $ millions), we also take the natural logarithm of the fund assets and use it as a 
proxy for fund size in our regressions. The average number of securities held, is measured by taking 
the average of the minimum number and the maximum number that can be held in a portfolio. Fund 
age is measured by subtracting the year the first account was launched from the first quarter of the 
fund year. Portfolio turnover (%) shows the number of times a fund turns over per year, the dividend 
yield shows the % of dividends paid, and the price to book ratio shows the relation between the 
stock‘s market price and its book value. The momentum measures the effects of the returns of the past 
on performance and is the annualized 1 year return prior to performance therefore it‘s taken in year t 
– 1. The management fees indicate  the % of fees charged, it is expressed as a decimal and finally, 
capitalization is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the fund is a small, mid, or smid 
capitalization fund and zero otherwise. Panel A, represents the summary statistics of the Canadian 
Sample while panel B shows the summary statistics of the US Sample. 
Panel A: Canadian Sample 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Performance 
measures 
       
Excess Ret  -0.27 -0.29 3.17 -13.27 16.24 0.34 4.10 
Jensen‘s alpha  -0.19 -0.32 3.30 -16.10 18.04 0.33 3.96 
Sharpe Ratio  -0.02 0.00 0.21 -0.99 0.73 -0.44 1.37 
        
Systematic risk        
Beta  0.91 0.93 0.18 -0.02 1.62 -0.29 2.48 
        
Human capital & Actions       
Team size 5.98 5 4.71 1 38 2.61 11.70 
Experience 16.94 15 7.70 2 48 1.15 1.53 
Employee Equity 
ownership 47.14 40 41.74 0 100 0.15 -1.64 
Manager Turnover 27.04 11 49.73 0 500 4.67 32.60 
Visits 185.73 100 292.73 0 3000 5.58 46.77 
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Panel A (continued) 
Fund 
characteristics        
Fund assets under 
management (in 
millions) 1011.81 386 1931.00 0.42 18516 5.10 35.81 
Log fund assets 5.56 5.96 2.03 -0.87 9.83 -0.68 0.03 
Avg securities held 57.45 45 56.79 10.5 650 6.76 61.32 
Fund age 16.64 13.25 11.84 1.25 70.25 1.32 1.94 
Portfolio Turnover 61.02 38.45 57.03 0 346 1.88 4.19 
Dividend Yield 2.83 2.58 1.31 0 10.571 1.72 6.22 
Price to Book ratio 2.01 1.97 0.64 0.6 7.2 1.70 9.57 
Momenturm 5.95 0.37 35.25 -55.08 136.29 0.51 -0.48 
% of fees charged 
expressed in 
decimals 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.0004 0.052 7.69 65.63 



















Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: US Sample 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Performance 
measures        
Excess Ret  -0.27 -0.04 9.60 -16.94 441.41 37.90 1745.54 
Jensen‘s alpha  -0.14 -0.39 4.72 -14.37 163.95 17.40 598.30 
Sharpe Ratio  -0.41 -0.43 0.27 -1.34 0.68 0.23 0.03 
        
Systematic risk        
Beta  0.94 0.93 0.20 -1.02 3.41 0.40 16.71 
        
Human capital & Actions       
Team size 7.34 6.00 5.70 1 39 2.42 7.71 
Experience 17.30 17.00 5.68 4 49 0.81 1.31 
Employee Equity 
ownership 54.44 64.00 43.61 0 100 -0.17 -1.74 
Manager Turnover 32.65 4.00 191.76 0 3300 14.47 220.46 
Visits 545.87 60.00 1753.50 0 10000 4.86 23.08 
        
Fund characteristics        
Fund assets under 
management (in 
millions) 1212.10 347.79 3321.10 0.04 90375.70 13.02 272.75 
Log fund assets 5.58 5.85 2.11 -3.22 11.41 -0.87 1.35 
Avg securities held 94.74 62.50 113.30 10 1854 6.63 74.94 
Fund age 13.24 11.25 9.65 1.25 85.25 2.22 9.54 
Portfolio Turnover 80.92 64.00 65.49 0 896.40 2.88 18.74 
Dividend Yield 1.64 1.45 1.78 0 63.27 20.46 646.91 
Price to Book ratio 2.53 2.24 2.29 0.05 99.90 31.77 1338.06 
Momenturm -3.81 -14.17 23.92 -60.67 100.91 0.85 -0.20 
% of fees charged 
expressed in decimals 0.01 0.01 0.005 0.00004 0.08 11.10 160.49 






Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
This table shows the correlation matrix of all the variables used in the study. It gives us preliminary view of the association between 
all the variables. Panel A, presents the correlation matrix for the Canadian Sample while panel B shows the correlation matrix for the 
US Sample.  
Panel A: Canadian Sample 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Excess Ret (1) 1.00                  
Jensen‘s alpha (2) 0.11 1.00                 
Beta (3) 0.17 0.08 1.00                
Sharpe Ratio (4) 0.27 0.68 0.01 1.00               
Team size (5) 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.05 1.00              
Experience (6) 0.06 -0.18 0.02 -0.10 -0.18 1.00             
Visits (7) 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.28 -0.06 1.00            
Employee Equity own (8) 0.03 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.01 0.22 -0.17 1.00           
Avg securities held (9) 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.00 -0.19 1.00          
Fund age (10) 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.17 0.06 -0.20 -0.10 1.00         
Portfolio Turnover (11) 0.07 0.18 0.37 0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.29 1.00        
Manager Turnover (12) 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.16 -0.12 -0.09 -0.22 0.02 0.15 0.03 1.00       
Dividend Yield (13) 0.03 -0.07 -0.40 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.14 0.02 1.00      
Price to Book ratio (14) -0.08 -0.05 0.15 -0.27 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.03 -0.38 1.00     
Management Fees (15) 0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.45 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.10 0.44 -0.25 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 1.00    
Momentum (16) -0.09 0.16 0.07 0.39 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.35 0.29 0.03 1.00   
Log fund assets (17) -0.01 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.31 -0.12 0.16 -0.05 0.03 0.31 -0.26 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.64 0.04 1.00  




Panel B: US Sample
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Excess Ret (1) 1.00                  
Jensen‘s alpha (2) 0.73 1.00                 
Beta (3) 0.26 0.27 1.00                
Sharpe Ratio (4) 0.18 0.52 0.03 1.00               
Team size (5) 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.01 1.00              
Experience (6) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.25 1.00             
Visits (7) 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 1.00            
Employee Equity own (8) -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.19 0.13 1.00           
Avg securities held (9) -0.02 -0.09 0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.14 1.00          
Fund age (10) 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 1.00         
Portfolio Turnover (11) 0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 0.04 -0.10 0.10 -0.17 1.00        
Manager Turnover (12) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00       
Dividend Yield (13) -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.01 1.00      
Price to Book ratio (14) 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.11 1.00     
Management Fees (15) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.13 -0.04 0.00 0.29 -0.10 -0.02 0.03 0.00 1.00    
Momenturm (16) 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.54 -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.16 0.08 0.07 1.00   
Log fund assets (17) -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.21 -0.09 0.16 -0.12 0.12 0.35 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.49 0.01 1.00  
Capitalization (18) 0.11 0.17 -0.02 0.27 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.03 -0.11 0.11 -0.03 -0.24 -0.10 -0.10 0.02 -0.12 1.00 
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Table 3: Fund vs. manager Characteristics 
The table shows the preliminary regressions of various fund characteristics against the fund manager‘s characteristics and actions. 
Each regression is tested with without the capitalization dummy; therefore, model 1 of each regression includes the capitalization 
dummy, while model 2 excludes it. This is done in order to see the effect of small and mid capitalization funds on the various 
characteristics of the fund. The interpretations of these results generally focus on Model 1 of each regression. n represents the number 
of observations, followed by the F value and r square of the regressions. All standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Panel A, reports the results for the Canadian Sample while panel B 
reports the results for the US Sample. 
Panel A: Canadian Sample 
  Dependent Variables 
 Management Fee Portfolio Turnover Log Fund assets Beta 
Independent Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 
         
Intercept -0.2441 -0.8292 83.7808 81.3767 5.9118 5.6727 0.9277 0.9128 
 -0.15 -0.53 (7.41)*** (7.28)*** (18.37)*** (17.26)*** (36.66)*** (38.78)*** 
Team size 0.5067 0.5297 -1.2457 -1.1357 0.0970 0.1098 0.0001 0.0006 
 (3.71)*** (3.95)*** (-2.72)*** (-2.62)*** (4.93)*** (5.58)*** 0.04 0.38 
Experience 0.1102 0.1140 -0.8332 -0.8214 -0.0361 -0.0393 0.0018 0.0020 
 1.51 1.54 (-2.09)** (-2.07)** (-2.37)** (-2.53)** 1.53 (1.74)* 
Visits -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0015 0.0004 0.0005   
 (-2.06)** (-1.96)* -0.33 -0.31 (1.82)* (1.94)*   
Manager Turnover -0.0049 -0.0033 -0.0414 -0.0332 -0.0055 -0.0039 0.0000 0.0001 
 -0.81 -0.55 -0.44 -0.34 (-2.3)** (-1.65)* 0.1 0.35 
Employee Equity own 0.0047 0.0036 0.0434 0.0393 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 0.54 0.4 0.48 0.44 -0.51 -0.94 (-4.04)*** (-4.2)*** 
Capitalization -1.5446  -6.4202  -0.9615  -0.0439  
 (-2.9)***  -0.89  (-4.07)***  (-2.16)**  
n 248 248 358 358 337 337 472 472 
F value (13.05)*** (14.86)*** 1.2 1.29 (13.24)*** (12.13)*** (5.19)*** (5.38)*** 
r-square 0.2453 0.2349 0.0201 0.018 0.194 0.1548 0.0528 0.044 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: US Sample 
  Dependent Variables 
 Management Fee Portfolio Turnover Log Fund assets Beta 
Independent Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 Model 1  Model 2 
         
Intercept 1.80797 0.63388 126.3794 134.6515 5.58611 5.36657 0.92625 0.92205 
 1.55 0.49 (19.81)*** (21.54)*** (29.15)*** (28.82)*** (55.09)*** (55.88)*** 
Team size 0.49456 0.49583 -0.95364 -0.96285 0.09326 0.09382 0.00244 0.00245 
 (6.5)*** (6.48)*** (-3.47)*** (-3.55)*** (10.42)*** (10.41)*** (3.35)*** (3.35)*** 
Experience 0.19371 0.21276 -2.30965 -2.4211 -0.01126 -0.00778 -0.00033 -0.00026 
 (3.11)*** (3.26)*** (-8.15)*** (-8.47)*** -1.23 -0.84 -0.36 -0.28 
Visits 0.00124 0.00127 0.0015 0.00131 0.00022 0.000225   
 (6.79)*** (7.06)*** (2.56)** (2.29)** (10.14)*** (10.62)***   
Manager Turnover -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.00543 -0.00624 -4.4E-05 -2.3E-05 1.33E-05 1.37E-05 
 (-3.86)*** (-3.81)*** (-1.87)* (-2.31)** -0.35 -0.19 1.5 1.55 
Employee Equity own -0.02866 -0.031 -0.11867 -0.10059 -0.00757 -0.00801 3.54E-05 2.76E-05 
 (-3.67)*** (-3.99)*** (-3.88)*** (-3.3)*** (-7.48)*** (-7.89)*** 0.34 0.28 
Capitalization -1.97566  15.37708  -0.36537  -0.00699  
 (-3.21)***  (5.53)***  (-4.23)***  -0.83  
         
n 2025 2025 1986 1986 2071 2071 2415 2415 
F value (20.98)*** (23.22)*** (23.68)*** (21.84)*** (45.72)*** (51.01)*** (2.7)** (3.21)** 
r square 0.0587 0.0544 0.067 0.0523 0.1173 0.1099 0.0056 0.0053 
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Table 4: Heteroscedasticity consistent OLS results of performance, risk and fees 
This table shows the first methodology employed which is the ordinary least squares methodology with heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses. Three different performance measures are employed, namely, the excess returns, the 4 yr 
Jensen‘s Alpha, and the 4 yr Sharpe ratio. The 4 yr beta regression represents the systematic risk of the fund while the portfolio 
turnover regression shows the trading activity of the funds, and finally the management fees equations are tested three times using a 
different performance measure in the equation each time. Model 1 is the management fee equation using excess return as the measure 
of performance, Model 2 uses Jensen‘s alpha as the performance measure and Model 3 uses the Sharpe ratio as the performance 
measure. n represents the number of observations, followed by the F value and r square of the regressions. All standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Panel A, reports the results for the 
Canadian Sample while panel B reports the results for the US Sample. 
  Panel A: Canadian Sample 
   Dependent Variables 
          





Sharpe Ratio Beta 
Portfolio 
Turnover 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Independent Variables 
          
 Intercept -4.60469 2.67942 0.21577 0.7617 135.9309 0.3194 0.52606 0.48259 
  (-1.91)* 1.09 (1.92)* (13.18)*** (6.29)*** 0.18 0.3 0.28 
 Beta 4.31196 -1.0254 -0.01174      
  (2.32)** -0.56 -0.12      
 excess ret      0.02754   
       0.38   
 Jensen's alpha       -0.07485  
        -0.85  
 Sharpe Ratio        1.46572 
         1.11 
 Portfolio Turnover 0.0008767 0.00645 0.000292 0.00112  -0.01016 -0.01099 -0.01182 
  0.22 1.37 1.09 (5.03)***  (-2.71)*** (-2.96)*** (-3.21)*** 
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 Panel A (continued) 
         
          
 Management fees -0.00723 0.01397 0.00157      
  -0.2 0.33 0.76      
 Visits 0.00001014 -0.00032 -5.7E-06  -0.0012 -0.00203 -0.00202 -0.00199 
  0.04 -0.7 -0.19  -0.24 (-1.84)* (-1.88)* (-1.79)* 
 Experience    0.00187 -1.26858 -0.0062 -0.01122 -0.00802 
     1.18 (-2.68)*** -0.09 -0.17 -0.12 
 Team size     -0.80738 0.40556 0.41604 0.41289 
      (-1.93)* (3.37)*** (3.45)*** (3.42)*** 
 Employee Equity Own -0.00672 -0.01012 -0.00023 -0.00076 -0.05697    
  -1.01 -1.46 -0.66 (-3.19)*** -0.65    
 Manager Turnover 0.01291 0.00557 0.000261 -0.00077 -0.11769    
  (1.99)** 0.57 0.5 (-2.28)** -1.11    
 Securities held    0.00106 0.25398 -0.00546 -0.0082 -0.00721 
     (2.33)** 1.62 -0.29 -0.42 -0.37 
 Fund age 0.00698 0.00545 0.00117 0.00166  0.17725 0.17376 0.17497 
  0.32 0.26 0.94 (1.74)*  (4.59)*** (4.31)*** (4.36)*** 
 Dividend Yield 0.17813 -0.09848 0.01982      
  0.81 -0.4 1.18      
 Price to Book -0.28878 0.29412 -0.12576      
  -0.63 0.55 (-4.77)***      
 Log fund assets 0.0963 -0.29907 -0.01035 0.00635 -8.64517    
  0.7 -1.46     -1.11                      1.18 (-4.22)***     
          
 Momentum 0.00521 0.00604 0.00322      
  0.79 0.79 (8.15)***      
 Capitalization    -0.05479 -16.427 -1.23681 -1.09717 -1.14447 
     (-2.5)** (-2.1)** (-2.29)** (-1.86)* (-2.04)** 
                   
 n 197 197 197 301 300 254 243 243 
 F value (1.65)* 1.52 (8.69)*** (11.22)*** (4.95)*** (16.72)*** (16.01)*** (16.07)*** 
 r square 0.0893 0.083 0.3407 0.2351 0.1198 0.3532 0.3537 0.3546 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B: US Sample 
  Dependent Variables 
         





Sharpe Ratio Beta 
Portfolio 
Turnover 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent Variables 
         
Intercept -18.44215 -7.81821 -0.33381 0.89742 141.06036 -0.7434 -0.54326 2.89017 
 -1.25 -1.46 (-7.23)*** (40.34)*** (16.12)*** -0.58 -0.4 (1.8)* 
Beta 19.99022 9.50882 0.0694      
 1.25 1.65 (1.99)**      
Excess ret      0.01957   
      (1.81)*   
Jensen's alpha       0.12362  
       (1.9)*  
Sharpe ratio        6.67224 
        (5.4)*** 
Portfolio turnover -0.00504 -0.00563 -8.8E-05 0.000294  -0.01271 -0.01314 -0.01074 
 -0.85 (-2.23)** -0.9 (3.51)***  (-3.58)*** (-3.55)*** (-3)*** 
Management fees 0.01352 0.03102 0.00342      
 1.16 (3.24)*** (4.84)***      
Visits -0.0001938 3.456E-05 5.76E-06  0.0023 0.00108 0.00107 0.00102 
 -1.03 0.47 (2.46)**  (3.75)*** (6.29)*** (6.19)*** (6)*** 
Experience    0.000338 -2.32647 0.02409 0.02305 0.000788 
    0.4 (-8.21)*** 0.4 0.37 0.01 
Team Size     -0.53813 0.40417 0.40249 0.39606 





Panel B (continued) 
         
         
Employee Equity Own -0.00844 -0.00336 0.000131 0.000206 -0.13929    
 -0.82 -0.83 1.05 (1.92)* (-4.27)***    
Manager Turnover -5.696E-05 -0.00025 -2.1E-05 3.38E-06 -0.00623    
 -0.16 -1.22 -0.91 0.38 (-2.36)**    
Securities held    4.07E-05 0.04572 0.0042 0.0053 0.00636 
    1.49 (3.03)*** (2.03)** (2.17)** (2.53)** 
Fund age 0.01395 0.01452 0.000414 -1.7E-05  0.37392 0.36844 0.36363 
 0.96 (1.66)* 0.66 -0.04  (8.93)*** (8.45)*** (8.37)*** 
Dividend Yield -0.04724 -0.21734 -0.00786      
 -0.22 -1.33 -0.99      
Price to Book 0.07771 0.06492 -0.00239      
 0.77 1.15 -0.68      
Log fund assets -0.01204 -0.15481 -0.02363 0.00226 -3.62372    
 -0.1 (-2.48)** (-6.4)*** 1.01 (-4.65)***    
Momentum 0.00663 0.00135 0.00584      
 0.85 0.28 (24.23)***      
Capitalization    -0.01932 13.93989 -1.51576 -1.79312 -2.70483 
                                 (-2.13)*** (4.83)*** (-2.46)** (-2.83)*** (-3.87)***  
                  
n 1697 1697 1697 2080 1873 1877 1816 1816 
F value (19.7)*** (25.3)*** (78.75)*** (3.07)*** (23.09)*** (30.31)*** (28.58)*** (31.53)*** 
r square 0.1139 0.1417 0.3395 0.0117 0.0902 0.1149 0.1123 0.1225 
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Table 5: 3sls results of risk, performance, and fees 
This table shows the results of the second methodology employed, the three stage least 
squares estimation, taking into account the simultaneity of the performance, risk, and fee 
equations including portfolio turnover. We utilize three systems in this procedure in order to 
test the three performance measures of the fund, therefore, the first system uses the fund‘s 
excess returns as the fund performance measure, the second system uses the 4 yr Jensen‘s 
alpha as the fund performance measure, while the third system uses the 4 yr Sharpe ratio as 
the fund performance measure. For each system, n represents the number of observations, 
followed by the F value and r square of the regressions. All standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panels A, B and C of table 5 represent the 3sls results of the Canadian Sample with Excess 
return, Jensen‘s alpha, and the Sharpe ratio as the performance measures respectively; while 
panel D, E, and  F represent the 3sls results of the US Sample with Excess return, Jensen‘s 
alpha, and the Sharpe ratio as the performance measures respectively. 
Panel A: Canadian Sample Using the Excess Return as the performance measure 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 





     
Intercept -8.44541 -0.33666 6.068704 133.3206 
 -1.06 (-2.24)** (1.87)* (6.47)*** 
excess ret   0.103908  
   0.11  
Beta 16.84279    
 1.29    
Portfolio turnover -0.05607 0.008224 -0.12369  
 -0.63 (9.85)*** (-5.33)***  
Management fee 0.039357    
 0.28    
Company Visits 0.000279  -0.00035 0.011346 
 0.19  -0.3 1.63 
Experience  0.00568 0.037549 -0.48929 
  (1.96)* 0.43 -0.73 
Team size   0.330296 -0.07305 
   (4.5)*** -0.17 
Employee Equity 
Own -0.01042 0.001189  -0.11803 
 -0.52 (2.56)**  -1.31 
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Panel A (continued)     
Manager turnover 0.015536 -5.54E-06  0.042916 
 1.35 -0.01  0.34 
securities held  0.001648 0.028614 0.448304 
  (2.32)** 1.11 (2.52)** 
Fund age -0.05084 0.010223 0.141874  
 -0.33 (5.97)*** (2.38)**  
Log fund assets -0.50494 0.055616  -13.3113 
 -1.28 (5.53)***  (-7.62)*** 
Dividend Yield 0.629418    
 1.25    
Price to book -0.70792    
 -0.97    
Momentum 0.011463    
 1.17    
Capitalization  -0.01781 -0.56173 -9.79256 
  -0.45 -0.38 -1.06 
n 196 196 196 196 
F value 0.57 (4.49)*** (12.21)*** (4.16)*** 












Panel B: Canadian Sample using the Jensen‘s Alpha as the performance measure 








     
Intercept 14.50203 -0.32901 1.501446 133.0749 
 0.92 (-2.2)** 0.31 (6.28)*** 
Jensen's alpha   -1.90227  
   -1.47  
Beta -28.984    
 -1.12    
Portfolio turnover 0.135316 0.008084 -0.05834  
 0.76 (9.74)*** -1.21  
Management fee 0.095184    
 0.6    
Company Visits -0.00131  -0.00132 0.011372 
 -0.49  -0.84 1.62 
Experience  0.006466 -0.00135 -0.72209 
  (2.25)** -0.01 -1.08 
Team size   0.392734 -0.19565 
   (3.65)*** -0.45 
Employee Equity Own -0.00541 0.001226  -0.12056 
 -0.14 (2.52)**  -1.18 
Manager turnover 0.025285 0.000597  -0.14127 
 1.13 0.95  -1 
securities held  0.002441 0.02351 0.309159 
  (6.6)*** 0.7 (2.07)** 
Fund age 0.088896 0.010346 0.206295  
 0.29 (6.05)*** (2.24)**  
Log fund assets 0.388911 0.044823  -10.778 
 0.58 (4.18)***  (-5.08)*** 
Dividend Yield -1.15573    
 -1.17    
Price to book 1.400694    
 1.12    
Momentum -0.01446    
 -0.99    
Capitalization  -0.02995 2.692229 -7.4109 
  -0.75 0.98 -0.79 
n 196 196 196 196 
F value 0.34 (4.49)*** (8.53)*** (4.16)*** 





Panel C: Canadian Sample using the Sharpe Ratio as the performance measure 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 




     
Intercept -0.68427 -0.34496 5.696457 136.9065 
 -1.57 (-2.26)** (1.74)* (6.37)*** 
Sharpe Ratio   2.4218  
   0.74  
Beta 0.938206    
 1.32    
Portfolio turnover 0.00028 0.008297 -0.11791  
 0.06 (9.95)*** (-4.93)***  
Management fee 0.005733    
 0.61    
Company Visits -0.00004  -0.00013 0.011572 
 -0.48  -0.11 (1.66)* 
Experience  0.005655 0.041394 -0.51859 
  (1.94)* 0.45 -0.77 
Team size   0.332745 -0.05967 
   (4.46)*** -0.14 
Employee Equity Own 0.000113 0.00122  -0.12738 
 0.1 (2.7)***  -1.52 
Manager turnover 0.00015 5.49E-06  0.037081 
 0.23 0.01  0.36 
securities held  0.001535 0.021586 0.409674 
  (1.74)* 0.79 (2.04)** 
Fund age -0.00205 0.010223 0.15453  
 -0.24 (5.97)*** (2.89)***  
Log fund assets -0.00662 0.056855  -13.4288 
 -0.28 (5.69)***  (-7.68)*** 
Dividend Yield 0.061239    
 (2.21)**    
Price to book -0.1638    
 (-3.9)***    
Momentum 0.003737    
 (6.46)***    
Capitalization  -0.01654 -0.50291 -9.75274 
  -0.42 -0.41 -1.06 
n 196 196 196 196 
F value (5.32)*** (4.49)*** (11.58)*** (4.16)*** 





Panel D: US Sample using the Excess return as the performance measure 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Excess ret Beta Management Fees Portfolio Turnover 
     
Intercept 140.8497 0.575369 46.26114 130.114 
 (3.02)*** (9.89)*** (2.87)*** (18.18)*** 
Excess ret   6.693938  
   (2.82)***  
Beta -140.305    
 (-3.47)***    
Portfolio Turnover -0.1309 0.002628 -0.28004  
 (-1.77)* (6.41)*** (-2.62)***  
Management Fees -0.5018    
 -1.32    
Company Visits 0.001666  0.001635 0.002686 
 (2.84)***  (2.53)** (3.91)*** 
Experience  0.0053 -0.84862 -1.97797 
  (4.41)*** (-2.34)** (-7.41)*** 
Team size   0.3934 -0.22187 
   1.64 -0.89 
Employee Equity Own -0.00249 0.000618  -0.12193 
 -0.16 (5.1)***  (-3.78)*** 
Manager turnover -0.00277 0.000011  -0.0054 
 -1.58 0.56  -0.94 
Securities held  0.000056 -0.00352 0.05742 
  (1.9)* -0.46 (4.93)*** 
Fund age -0.13437 0.000319 0.096111  
 -1.07 0.51 0.55  
Dividend Yield -2.27588    
 (-1.88)*    
Price to book -0.1729    
 -1.12    
Log fund assets 1.829638 0.007961  -3.66438 
 1.55 (3.1)***  (-5.23)*** 
Momentum -0.02308    
 -1    
Capitalization  -0.05195 -10.9043 13.88212 
  (-4.52)*** (-2.01)** (5.06)*** 
          
n 1689 1689 1689 1689 
F value 0.44 (3.05)*** (2.54)*** (19.87)*** 






Panel E: US Sample using the Jensen‘s alpha as the performance measure 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 




     
Intercept 83.09009 0.594045 17.18657 145.135 
 (2.88)*** (10.04)*** (3.49)*** (20.57)*** 
Jensen's alpha   -1.13724  
   -1.16  
Beta -82.8559    
 (-3.31)***    
Portfolio Turnover -0.03413 0.002592 -0.17491  
 -0.76 (6.29)*** (-5.92)***  
Management Fees -0.04699    
 -0.22    
Company Visits 0.000887  0.001465 0.003093 
 (2.55)**  (6.25)*** (4.53)*** 
Experience  0.004904 -0.31405 -2.10601 
  (4.07)*** (-3.23)*** (-7.9)*** 
Team size   0.308779 0.034386 
   (4.17)*** 0.14 
Employee Equity Own 0.01252 0.000651  -0.07648 
 1.23 (5.13)***  (-2.49)** 
Manager turnover -0.00057 0.000015  -0.00243 
 (-0.39)* 0.72  -0.45 
Securities held  0.000084 0.004136 0.06507 
  (3.3)*** 1.37 (5.55)*** 
Fund age -0.0517 0.000911 0.312625  
 -0.67 1.45 (5.91)***  
Dividend Yield -1.2241    
 -1.65    
Price to book 0.066528    
 0.63    
Log fund assets -0.12813 0.004181  -6.72884 
 -0.19 1.54  (-10.1)*** 
Momentum -0.01523    
 -1.08    
Capitalization  -0.05238 2.835341 12.20525 
  (-4.55)*** (1.69)* (4.45)*** 
          
n 1689 1689 1689 1689 
F value 0.84 (3.05)*** (29.6)*** (19.87)*** 





Panel F: US Sample using the Sharpe ratio as the performance measure 
  Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Sharpe Ratio Beta Management Fees Portfolio Turnover 
     
Intercept 8.206976 0.55325 25.48379 152.1646 
 (3.81)*** (9.34)*** (7.39)*** (22.02)*** 
Sharpe Ratio   -2.34542  
   -0.99  
Beta -8.44696    
 (-4.53)***    
Portfolio Turnover -0.00501 0.002635 -0.238  
 -1.49 (6.38)*** (-8.37)***  
Management Fees -0.00326    
 -0.22    
Company Visits 0.00009  0.00145 0.00313 
 (3.56)***  (7.91)*** (4.59)*** 
Experience  0.00551 -0.44338 -2.20254 
  (4.57)*** (-5.17)*** (-8.28)*** 
Team size   0.278174 0.116371 
   (4.15)*** 0.47 
Employee Equity Own 0.000412 0.000539  -0.03596 
 0.54 (4.28)***  -1.26 
Manager turnover -0.00011 8.82E-06  -0.00011 
 -1.06 0.42  -0.02 
Securities held  0.000085 0.002862 0.06969 
  (3.68)*** 0.97 (5.95)*** 
Fund age -0.01197 0.00056 0.230788  
 (-2.08)** 0.89 (5.94)***  
Dividend Yield -0.13521    
 (-2.43)**    
Price to book -0.00447    
 -0.61    
Log fund assets 0.019841 0.010636  -8.17967 
 0.42 (3.95)***  (-13.28)*** 
Momentum 0.004333    
 (4.2)***    
Capitalization  -0.05001 2.167356 11.21842 
  (-4.34)*** (2.25)** (4.1)*** 
          
n 1689 1689 1689 1689 
F value (4.38)*** (3.05)*** (30.32)*** (19.87)*** 
r square 0.02792 0.01431 0.12617 0.08643 
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